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INTRODUCTION

For decades, labor and employment policy at the federal level has been
debated through a partisan lens. Unions and other worker advocates generally
support Democrats who, in turn, pursue greater government intervention in the
workplace and labor market both to achieve certain social and economic goals
and to disrupt unfair hierarchies. The business community and smallgovernment conservatives generally support Republicans who, in turn, typically
oppose government intervention in the workplace and labor market, preferring
that markets and private decision-makers assign resources and distribute
economic product.'
Hidden beneath this heatedly ideological and interest-driven partisan
divide is a surprising and rarely discussed consensus regarding the management
of labor and employment policies and programs. Both Democrats and
Republicans want the United States Department of Labor, for example, to be
run efficiently and cost-effectively, and to achieve meaningful outcomes for the
people and entities it serves. While there is debate about ends and some means,
there is broad consensus that money should be spent wisely and taxpayers
should expect a meaningful return on their investments.
In truth, "consensus" may overstate the case. Government management
is rarely debated in Washington, even in the partisan world of labor and
employment policy. It draws little attention or interest. One quick anecdote will
support this assertion. During my tenure as Deputy Secretary and Chief
Operating Officer of the Labor Department, the department's performance
management staff created an "Annual Performance Index" that collected data
showing how well or poorly the department and its constituent agencies had
done their jobs during the preceding fiscal year.2 The index offered valuable

I

See, e.g., Chris Opfer, Chamber, Labor Spend Big in Senate Races with Different
Strategies for Reaching Voters, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 18, 2014), http://www.bna.com/
chamber-labor-spend-ni7179897271/; Lydia Saad, Democrats More Confident in Labor;
Republicans, in Business, GALLUP (June 20, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/155267/
democrats-confident-labor-republicans-business.aspx.
2
See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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insights into the management of the department's programs and agencies, how
the agencies' leadership teams had prioritized their work, and the trajectory of
the agencies' performance as compared with their own past performance. The
index was the culmination of a multi-year effort to make dramatic
improvements in the department's performance. 3 Beginning in fall 2013, the
Labor Department's congressional affairs office sought to organize a meeting
with congressional staff at which I would brief them on the latest index and
discuss the department's performance management program. How many
congressional staff agreed to attend the briefing? Zero. Based on prior
experience, I considered that response to be an accurate representation of their
bosses' interest in the topic.
When asked, both Republicans and Democrats would agree they want
the Labor Department to be managed effectively. But neither party campaigns
on management issues, or even raises them frequently in congressional
hearings or speeches on the floors of the House of Representatives or Senate.4
These issues hold little appeal to the parties' political bases, and they generate
much less heat than a fight over, for example, the Employee Free Choice Act. 5
A cynic might suggest it "goes without saying" that both parties support
effective management of labor and employment policy.
Yet, meaningful social change can result from the effective
management of the resources available to the Labor Department and other
government agencies administering labor and employment laws, as well as
other federal agencies. Good management should not be viewed as an end in
itself, or a means to achieve the ill-defined goal of "good government." Rather,
3

Seth D. Harris, Op-Ed: Labor's Moneyball Approach to Boosting Performance,NEXTGOV

(Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.nextgov.com/big-data/2014/01/op-ed-labors-moneyball-approachboosting-performance/7678 1/?orefrng-dropdown.
4
We searched for hearings relating to the Labor Department's compliance with or
performance under the Government Performance and Results Act or the GPRA Modernization
Act held by the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee or the House
Education and Workforce Committee-the Labor Department's principal "authorizing
committees" -- and the Senate and House Appropriations Committees' sub-committees with
jurisdiction over the Labor Department since January 2009. We found none. See infra note 32.
5
Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); Employee Free
Choice Act of 2009, S. 560, 11 1th Cong. (2009). The Employee Free Choice Act would have
amended the National Labor Relations Act to better facilitate union organizing. Most important,
it would have permitted unions to be established in workplaces through a "card check" process
involving the collection of authorization cards from a majority of workers rather than an election
run by the National Labor Relations Board. This proposed legislation proved to be a partisan
lightning rod. See Steven Greenhouse, Bill Easing Unionizing Is Under Heavy Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/us/O9abor.
html? r-0; Steven Greenhouse, Democrats Drop Key Part of Bill To Assist Unions, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/business/17union.html;
Deborah L. Cohen, Now Playing: The Employee Free Choice Act, REUTERS (Apr. 29, 2009, 1:32
PM), http://www.reuters.conarticle/2009/04/29/us-column-cohen-efca-idUSTRE53S67T200904
29.
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effective management, particularly performance management, can mean that
more workers' lives are saved in the workplace, more stolen wages are
recovered for the workers who earned them, more workplace civil rights
violations are remedied, more workers receive better skills training to prepare
for higher paying and long lasting jobs, and more workers' pension and health
plans are secure. 6 These results are achieved through improving the
administration of existing laws and programs rather than new legislation or
regulations.
In a partisan era, improved management may be the only
noncontroversial pathway to achieving these results. Congress's general
acquiescence in most executive branch planning and management choices, and
the general sense that better government management is a good thing for the
country, creates political space for executive branch leaders to dramatically
improve the performance of their departments and agencies. At the same time,
congressional inattention and failure to hold the executive branch accountable
for excellent management makes such improvement much less likely. For this
reason, those seeking social change should be more actively engaged in
ensuring that the Labor Department and other federal and state labor agencies
(e.g., the National Labor Relations Board, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, state labor departments) are managed effectively to significantly
improve the lives of America's working families. Simply, without meaningful
reform and outside pressure, Congress will not do it.
This Article tells the story of the successful efforts to turn around the
Labor Department's performance during the first five years of the Obama
Administration and deliver better outcomes for working families and others
served by the department. At its core, it is a story of how improved
performance management produced the results progressive advocates seek. But
it is also a tale of serious flaws in the legal infrastructure that governs federal
executive branch performance management and measurement, and Congress
abandoning the field after establishing this legal infrastructure. The Labor
Department's success came in spite of the congressionally enacted legal
system, not because of it, particularly in light of Congress's neglect of that
system. As a result, this Article argues that there is a great deal more to be done
to guarantee the continuation of the Labor Department's success and, perhaps,
to proliferate that success to other government agencies. Reforming the laws
that guide executive branch performance management and measurement is one
necessary step; however, this Article also argues that stakeholdersparticularly progressive stakeholders who care deeply about government's
role-must engage aggressively in policing government performance.
Part II of this Article describes the legal framework for executive
branch performance management and how the Labor Department, although
complying with the formal requirements of that legal framework, was not well

6

See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
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managed and did not perform well, in some regards, before President Obama
took office. Part III describes the Labor Department's performance
management turnaround efforts in the first five years of the Obama
Administration. These efforts far exceeded those required by law, but were
consistent with the larger government reform goals that President Obama
articulated and Congress sought to codify. Part III also describes the real-world
results these performance management efforts produced for working families
and others served by the Labor Department. Finally, Part IV proposes a reform
agenda to improve the way the Labor Department, other labor agencies, and
other executive branch entities manage their work.
II.

COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK VERSUS GOOD
PERFORMANCE

There is good reason to question Congress's constitutional authority to
direct how the Cabinet departments and other non-legislative agencies conduct
performance management and measurement.7 The Constitution's Article II,
Section 1 vests the President with the federal government's "executive"
powers. A plethora of statutes delegate authority to the President and his
Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officers to execute the functions established by those
laws. Thus, there is a nontrivial argument that the Constitution expects that
Congress will leave executive branch performance to the President and his
agency heads. On the other hand, Congress is vested with near plenary
authority over federal spending under Article I, Sections 8 and 9, including the
power to condition the use and receipt of funds on compliance with specific
congressional dictates.9 In an exercise of its responsibility to ensure that the
funds it appropriates are spent properly, Congress could argue that it should be
deeply and directly involved in measuring and assessing whether the executive
branch is performing well.
Ultimately, the constitutional argument is not the most important issue.
The larger problems are congressional competence and will to oversee
executive branch performance. Over the last 20 or so years, Congress has
enacted two statutes-the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
(GPRA) and the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA)--that were
intended to give structure and direction to the executive branch's strategic and
management planning. The first section will describe the system established by

7
For the reader's convenience, I am going to use "agency" or "agencies" to describe both
Cabinet departments, like the Labor Department, and non-Cabinet executive branch agencies,
like the Office of Personnel Management. For the purposes of this Article, the difference between
a department and agency is not important. I will use "department" on occasion to refer only to the
Labor Department.
8
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
9
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8-9.
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these two statutes, but it will also argue that Congress has not taken the
requisite steps to ensure effective implementation of these laws. In particular,
Congress has neither used its oversight function to cajole the executive branch
into better performance nor exercised its appropriations power to direct it. To
illustrate this point, the second section will describe seriously problematic
performance in the Labor Department before 2009 and the law's failure to force
better performance and better outcomes. The third section will specify the
lessons to be learned from the Labor Department's pre-2009 example-that is,
how and why specific flaws in the performance management legal
infrastructure, combined with congressional neglect, facilitated problematic
performance in the Labor Department before 2009.
A. The Legal Infrastructurefor Executive Branch Management Planning
This section will explain and critique the two laws that constitute the
legal infrastructure for performance management and measurement in the
federal executive branch: GPRA 10 and GPRAMA. 11
1. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA)
GPRA, enacted with support from President Bill Clinton,1 2 established
a reasonable and well-structured strategic and operating planning process for
the federal government's executive branch. Each executive branch agency was
directed to develop and publish a five-year strategic plan containing the
agency's mission statement, goals and objectives (commonly called "GPRA
goals"), and strategies to achieve the GPRA goals. 13 Agencies were also
directed to develop annual performance plans consisting of quantifiable and
measurable performance targets and a means for comparing actual performance
to performance targets. 14 Agencies were required to report annually on actual
performance compared with annual targets and to evaluate their success in
achieving targets while explaining any performance failures.15

10

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285

(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.).
11 GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.).
12

See Remarks on Signing the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and an

Exchange with Reporters, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1540, 1540 (Aug. 3, 1993) ("The Vice

President and I were both enthusiastic about this bill, and I am very, very pleased that it has
passed so rapidly.").
13

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993

14

Id. § 4.

15

Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss3/7

§ 3.

6

Harris: Managing for Social Change: Improving Labor Department Performanc

2015]

MANAGING SOCIAL CHANGE

With good reason, Congress expected that clearer articulation of
management goals and strategies, with regular reporting to Congress on actual
performance, would bring change. Two assumptions about human behavior lie
at GPRA's core. First, planning for success increases the likelihood of success.
Second, disclosure of plans and activities will cause the planner-actor to behave
more responsibly and effectively. GPRA requires both planning and disclosure,
so Congress expected that its enactment would cause performance to improve,
accountability to strengthen, the confidence of the American people in their
government to grow, and Congress to be better able to engage in meaningful
oversight of the executive branch. 16 Even given the loftiness of these goals, the
GPRA structure made a great deal of sense as a means of achieving those goals.
Federal agencies were required to define clearly their purpose for existing by
answering, what is the agency's mission? Even more important, each agency
was forced to state plainly how it would achieve its mission (strategies) and tell
Congress how it could know that the mission had been accomplished or that
meaningful progress had been made (goals and objectives). At the conceptual
level, GPRA was good legislation.
Perhaps GPRA's greatest contribution was its requirement that
17
agencies publicly articulate their "outcome measures"--their GPRA goals.
These are metrics that count the real-world impacts of government programs
that serve their agency's mission. Of course, this is the ultimate measure of the
government's success: whether it is improving American society to the extent
promised. One example that shows the importance and occasional complexity
of GPRA outcome goals comes from the Labor Department's Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA). MSHA defines its mission to be to "prevent
death, disease, and injury from mining and promote safe and healthful
workplaces for the Nation's miners."' Thus, one measure of MSHA's
effectiveness is whether miners are dying in workplace accidents. The
common-sense goal should be to reduce the number of fatalities to the lowest
level possible.
MSHA does not simply measure the absolute number of miners killed
at work each year. Instead, it measures a five-year rolling average of fatal
injuries per 200,000 hours worked.' 9 Why use such a complicated measure to
communicate whether MSHA is succeeding at one of its most important jobs?
Is MSHA obfuscating? Interestingly, MSHA publicly reports the number of
miners killed in coal and "metal/nonmetal" mines each year on its website.20
16

Id. § 2; 139 CONG. REC. S3078-01 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1993) (statement of Sen. William S.

Cohen).
17
See infra Part II.C.1 .iv for further discussion of "outcome" and "output" measures.
18

U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018, at 35 (2014).

19

Id. at 37.
MSHA Fatality Statistics, MINE

20

SAFETY

&

HEALTH ADMIN.,

http://www.msha.gov/stats/

charts/chartshome.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2015

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 117, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117

So, the agency is not hiding alternative fatality measures from Congress and the
public. To the contrary, the more complicated measure provides a better
assessment of MSHA's success.
MSHA divides the absolute number of fatal injuries by a fixed number
of hours worked to control for the size of the mining workforce. Simply, 10
deaths among 100 miners would be a qualitatively different outcome from 10
deaths among 100,000 miners. The first result would represent a catastrophic
failure by MSHA. The second result must be considered a greater success, even
acknowledging that any workplace fatality is unacceptable. This normative
difference is unavoidable even though the same number of workers have died.
Smoothing the results with a five-year average is a little more
controversial, but it has its own logic. As one former MSHA Assistant
Secretary once queried me in a private conversation, should the agency be held
accountable for the different outcomes if a miner lights a cigarette, setting off
an explosion in an empty mine between shifts, thereby killing only himself, and
another lights a cigarette in the middle of a crowded day shift and kills 50 coworkers? The best answer is "no." Judgments about agency effectiveness
should depend upon agency performance, not serendipity. Smoothing corrects
for serendipity, among other things. But regardless of which side of this
argument has the upper hand, MSHA's fatality measure offers the public and
Congress a great deal of insight into its performance with respect to one of the
most important mine health and safety outcomes. MSHA has been charged with
reducing the number of miners who die in mines. MSHA's measure tells us
whether it is accomplishing this part of its mission, arguably in a nuanced way.
Thus, Congress and the American people have a way of knowing if the
government, at least this part of the government, is working well. This is vital
information in a democracy.
The hope expressed in several "pilot project" provisions of GPRA was
that this kind of information could support more sophisticated decision-making
about federal spending. GPRA held out the promise that the federal government
would eventually move to a performance-based budgeting strategy-that is,
funding agencies based on their ability to produce, and the extent to which they
have produced, the outcomes promised by their GPRA goals. 2' More simply,
GPRA hinted that Congress would fund programs based on performance data.
In theory, performance-based budgeting is a worthwhile idea. Let us
return to the MSHA example. Unlike every other employment law enforcement
agency in the Labor Department (and perhaps outside, as well), MSHA is
statutorily mandated to investigate every mine, sand and gravel pit, and other
covered workplaces either twice (for above ground operations) or four times

requires mine operators to report fatalities to MSHA within 15 minutes. Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act, 30 U.S.C. § 8130) (2012).
21 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 § 2(b)(2).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss3/7

8

Harris: Managing for Social Change: Improving Labor Department Performanc
2015]

MANAGING SOCIAL CHANGE

(for below ground operations) each year.22 As a result, MSHA has rich data
about every violation and workplace fatality, injury, or illness. MSHA has
compiled a record, over time, of every investigation and other type of
intervention in the workplace, including its exercise of exceptional enforcement
powers like orders closing portions of mines until violations are remedied.23
MSHA knows how long every investigation took, how many violations were
found, and whether the same employer violated the same provisions of the law
or any others after the initial investigation. As a result, MSHA has a good
understanding of which enforcement and compliance strategies work well to
reduce violations, including in different circumstances and different types and
sizes of mines.
In a world of rational, outcome-focused congressional decisionmaking, congressional appropriators should fully fund every successful MSHA
strategy at the level required to achieve the maximum reduction in workplace
fatalities, injuries, and illnesses. If this world were entirely populated by
agencies as data-rich and evidence-based as MSHA, then Congress could go
further and undertake the morally difficult task of balancing investments in
saving miners' lives against health and safety outcomes achieved by other
agencies (e.g., the Centers for Disease Control reducing the incidence of
infectious disease and the U.S. Agriculture Department guarding against
foodborne illness). Yet, it has not happened. As of this writing, and despite
GPRA's two-decades-old hints that it would, Congress has not embraced
performance-based budgeting. This does not lead to the inevitable conclusion
that Congress is irrational. But it supports the argument offered below that
Congress failed to play its oversight role under GPRA.
2. GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA)
The GPRAMA refined the performance management process
established by GPRA. For example, agencies are now required to produce
strategic plans every four years, rather than five, so that the plans' schedule
coincides with presidential terms.24 But there are three particularly meaningful
reforms of GPRA included in the GPRAMA that demonstrate real learning
about government performance management.

22
23

Federal Mine Safety and Health Act § 813(a).
Another example is that MSHA takes more aggressive enforcement and investigative

action against mine operators with "patterns of violations." See 30 C.F.R. §§ 104.1-104.4 (2013)
(MSHA's newly revised pattern of violations regulation). MSHA's regulation sets standards for
determining whether a mine operator has exhibited a pattern of violations and what remedial
actions MSHA may take. See generally MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
PATTERN OF VIOLATIONS (POV) PROCEDURES SUMMARY (n.d.).

24

GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, § 2, 124 Stat. 3866, 3867 (2011)

(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 306(b) (2013)).
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With its first reform, Congress acknowledged that many outcomes
expected from government require the involvement of more than one agency.
Under the GPRAMA, the Director of the Office of Management Budget
(OMB) must assemble a government-wide performance plan consisting of
priority performance goals that cut across agencies ("cross-cutting goals") with
quarterly targets. 25 Little more needs to be said about this acknowledgement of
a truism of governmental life: Congress often assigns the same, overlapping, or
closely related responsibilities to more than one agency and has only limited
means of holding multiple agencies accountable. With more agencies involved,
responsibility gets diffused and conflicts can arise. Seeking ways of holding all
of the involved agencies accountable to a single measure was a sound and
uncontroversial reform.
Reading between the lines, however, the two other notable reforms
were more important and signaled that the conceptual soundness of GPRA had
not been matched by effective implementation. GPRA implicitly promised that
Congress would engage regularly and deeply on executive branch performance.
In its second notable GPRAMA reform, Congress implicitly pleaded for help in
carrying out its oversight role by requiring public disclosure of both
performance plans and performance results. The GPRAMA directs agencies to
develop and publish their annual performance plans on a public website.26 The
agencies are also required to report annually on their progress in achieving their
targets and, where performance fails to meet targets for two years, to explain
their failures to Congress and offer remediation plans, possibly including
requests for additional funding.27 In essence, since Congress tacitly
acknowledged that it was not paying attention to executive branch
performance, it hoped that requiring agencies to disclose their performance to
28
the public would embarrass them into (or perhaps "nudge" them toward)
better performance. Perhaps it also hoped that the public, or particular

25

Id.

§

3;

see

also

Cross-Agency

Priority

Goals,

PERFORMANCE.GOV,

http://www.performance.gov/cap-goals-list?view=public (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
26
GPRA Modernization Act § 2(a). There is no commonality or consistency in the structure
of budgets in the federal government, or even within a single agency. For example, the Labor
Department's Mine Safety and Health Administration has eight budget activities, while the
department's Wage & Hour Division has only one. CompareOFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2015 APPENDIX at
810 (Mine Safety and Health Administration budget explained and itemized), with id. at 805
(Wage & Hour Division budget explained and itemized).
27
GPRA Modernization Act § 4(h).
28
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 53-71 (Penguin Books 2009). But
see Peter M. Gollitzer et al., When Intentions Go Public: Does Social Reality Widen the
Intention-BehaviorGap?, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 612, 616 (2009) ("When other people take notice of
one's identity-relevant behavioral intentions, one's performance of the intended behaviors is
compromised.").
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agencies' stakeholders, would bring pressure directly on agencies to improve
their performance without waiting for congressional oversight.
The third reform fits this interpretation, as well. The GPRAMA sought
to strengthen accountability mechanisms within the executive branch by
promoting the "one neck to choke" theory of management. With respect to
agencies' priority goals, Congress required each agency's deputy secretary,
newly designated the "Chief Operating Officer," to hold quarterly meetings
about the agency's priority goals. Presumably, the Chief Operating Officer
would hold the agency's staff accountable in these meetings and, in turn, the
Secretary, the OMB Director, and Congress could wrap their collective hands
around the Chief Operating Officer's neck to ensure accountability and
performance. The GPRAMA also required agencies to publicly identify a
leader responsible for achieving success on each goal-again, allowing
Congress and the public to know which neck to choke without waiting for
Congress to perform the choking on their behalf.30 Congress further directed
the OMB Director to hold quarterly meetings with agencies and goal leaders
regarding their priority goals. 3'
Again, the best interpretation of this reform was that Congress knew it
had failed in its oversight role and needed someone else to review regularly
each agency's performance. This responsibility was effectively delegated to the
deputy secretaries and the OMB Director. Congress's tacit acknowledgement of
its failure is consistent with the lived experience of at least one Cabinet agency.
During my nearly five years as the Deputy Secretary and Chief Operating
Officer of the Labor Department in the Obama Administration, I was never
called to testify before the department's congressional authorizing committees
(the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee, and the House Education and Workforce Committee and
the House Ways & Means Committee) or its appropriations subcommittees,
regarding the Labor Department's performance, or even its compliance with
GPRA and the GPRAMA.3 a Further, I was never invited to meet with those
committees' and subcommittees' staffs to discuss the Labor Department's

29

GPRA Modernization Act § 8.

30

Id. § 5(b)(1)(C).
Id. §6.

31

conducted an informal survey of a half-dozen other deputy secretaries of domestic
Cabinet agencies whose service in the Obama Administration overlapped with mine. All of my
colleagues reported that they, too, had never been called to testify about GPRA, the GPRAMA,
or comprehensive agency performance by their authorizing committees or appropriations subcommittees. To check my memory of the Labor Department's experience, we searched in
ProQuest's Congressional Database and found no hearings or reports relating to GPRA or the
GPRAMA held by the Labor Department's authorizing or the appropriations committees or its
sub-committees during my tenure.
32

1
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compliance with GPRA and the GPRAMA.3 3 And, as my vignette rendered in
the Introduction discloses, congressional staff en masse failed to attend a
meeting that the Labor Department's congressional affairs staff sought to
organize for the purpose of disclosing and discussing the department's
performance. Simply, Congress played no role in overseeing the Labor
Department's compliance with either GPRA or the GPRAMA during President
Obama's first five years in office.
B. The Labor Department'sSerious PerformanceProblemsDespite
GPRA Compliance
When I returned to the Labor Department in early 2009, the department
was largely compliant with GPRA's requirements. The GPRAMA was still one
year or so removed, but the department had a five-year strategic plan with a
mission statement, goals, objectives, and strategies as required by GPRA.3 4 It
published annual performance plans that, on one occasion, won an award."
The department reported annually on its actual performance compared with
annual targets, 36 but the department's technical compliance with GPRA did not
result in effective performance across its agencies. In fact, in several agencies
(although certainly not all), performance was quite poor in 2009. After a brief
overview of the Labor Department's complex and diverse organizational
structure, this section offers some illustrative stories about Labor Department
performance in 2009 and explains how its performance management system,
such as it was, had failed.
1. An Overview of the Labor Department
The Labor Department is a federated agency; in essence, it is a
collection of smaller agencies with a roughly common mission. Depending
upon how you count, the department has around 23 operating units. There are
13 "line agencies" serving workers, employers, or others either directly or
through state, local, or not-for-profit grantees or contractors. Two agencies-

33

Again, other deputy secretaries reported that they were similarly ignored, at least on this

topic.
34
See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2011-2016 (2011), availableat
http://www.dol.gov/_sec/stratplan/StrategicPlan.pdf
35
See Performance Planningand Results, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/oasam/
PMC/PMC-ppr.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2015); U.S. Labor Department Earns Number One

Ranking of FederalAgencies for Programand FinancialPerformanceReporting, U.S. DEP'T OF

LABOR (May 5, 2009), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/oasam/OASAM20090505.htm;
Henry Wray et al., Mercatus Center Unveils l0th Annual Performance Scorecard,MERCATUS
CENTER (May 5, 2009), http://mercatus.org/mediaclipping/mercatus-center-unveils-10th-annualperformance-scorecard.
36
PerformancePlanningand Results, supra note 35.
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the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) and the Veterans
Employment and Training Service (VETS)-provide or fund workforce
development and job training services. Six worker protection agencies enforce
employment laws focused on various aspects of the employment relationship
and workplace. The Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP)
manages four diverse benefits programs for different groups of workers injured
or made ill on the job, and survivors of those killed. Three agencies are
principally engaged in developing and advocating policies relating to workers
with disabilities, women in the workplace, and international labor affairs. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) is the federal government's labor and price
statistics resource.
Each of these line agencies has multiple product lines. For example, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), one of the
department's best known worker protection agencies, engages in law
enforcement, worker education, compliance assistance to employers,
regulation, advisory services, and a host of other activities designed to make the
workplaces over which it has jurisdiction safer and healthier for workers.37
ETA funnels billions of dollars to hundreds of local workforce investment
boards to fund thousands of American Job Centers that provide job search and
job training services to workers. It also runs (through contractors) 125 Job
Corps residential and non-residential centers, providing education and job
training services to disadvantaged youth, and oversees states' unemployment
insurance systems, among many other activities. 38 BLS supplies a long list of
data series and statistical reports, including monthly releases on the previous
month's unemployment rate, wage trends, and job creation.39 In sum, the Labor
Department's agencies produce dozens of different products and services to
serve a variety of goals and to achieve an array of outcomes.
Six agencies support the work of the Labor Department's 13 line
agencies with staffs of lawyers, lobbyists, public affairs specialists,
procurement and budget experts, human resources personnel, information
technologists, and financial managers and accountants. The Labor Department
even houses four sets of judges who adjudicate certain categories of cases
produced by the department's line agencies. Overall, the department has
approximately 17,000 employees distributed throughout the United States and a

37

See Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2012).

38

See Program Administration,

JOB

CORPS,

http://www.jobcorps.gov/AboutJobCorps/

programadmin.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2015); The "PlainEnglish" Version of the Workforce
Investment Act of 1998, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.doleta.gov/usworkforce/wia/
Runningtext.cfn (last visited Feb. 27, 2015); Training: One-Stop Career Centers, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/training/onestop.htm#doltopics (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
39

Databases,

Tables

&

Calculators by

Subject,

BUREAU

OF

LABOR

STAT.,

http://www.bls.gov/data/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2015

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 117, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 7

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

1000

[Vol. 117

discretionary budget in the vicinity of $12 billion each year.40 It is a large,
complex, and diverse organization. Most important, it serves workers,
employers, and its other constituents through component agencies that are
semi-autonomous but operate under the direction of the department's Secretary
and Deputy Secretary.
2. Labor Department Performance Before 2009
Perhaps the most telling fact about the Labor Department in 2009 was
that, despite its compliance with GPRA, it did not have a system in place that
permitted an accurate assessment of the department's overall performance and,
in some cases, individual agencies' performance. The department and some of
its agencies did not measure many of the agencies' activities. One employment
law enforcement agency with a budget of approximately $100 million had only
three metrics in 2009, even though it had many more than three product lines.
Further, many of the department's metrics did not measure anything
meaningful. Some focused on process rather than outputs or outcomes. Others
seemed to be designed to ensure that the agency being measured would always
receive an "A" on its report card, regardless of the quality of its performance.
But this was not universally true. Some agencies, including BLS and OWCP,
had longstanding and comprehensive performance management systems that
pre-dated GPRA and had extensive sets of measures designed to capture all of
their performance. These systems had long been closely monitored by these
agencies' senior leaders. In fact, these well-managed agencies contributed a
disproportionate share of the department's total stock of performance measures
in 2009.
President Bush's Administration had instituted a system called the
Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) that gave "[e]ffective,"
"[m]oderately [e]ffective," "[a]dequate," or "[i]neffective" ratings to many
programs across the federal government.4 1 In private conversations, career staff
in the Labor Department admitted to me that the PART results reported by the
department to OMB were not an honest reflection of performance in the
department. Results were reported with the goal of achieving an "effective"
rating rather than to disclose the truth of an agency's performance management
and how it might improve. The same was true of the department's annual
performance report under GPRA. In a meeting early in 2009 with the
department's central performance staff, I asked if the glossy, aesthetically
pleasing, award-winning report was a "report to report" or a report that was
used to manage. Sheepishly, the staff admitted that it was a "report to report"

40

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

LABOR,

FY

2016

BUDGET

IN BRIEF

6

(2015),

available at

http://www.dol.gov/dol/budget/2016/PDF/FY2016BIB.pdf.
41
The Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), EXPECTMORE.GOV, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/expectmore/part.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
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and that managers did not use it to assess or improve their agency's
performance. 42
Later in my tenure, as we began to institute a new performance
management system at the Labor Department, I learned that two-thirds of the
department's operating units-including some of its largest and highest profile
agencies-did not have annual operating plans. This meant that the agencies
had not clearly articulated to the department's leadership, OMB, Congress, or
the public what they expected to produce and how much they expected to
produce from month-to-month and quarter-to-quarter, or how they made
choices about what and how much they would produce. In many cases, there
was no explanation of the relationship between agencies' day-to-day activities
and the outcomes they promised in the department's strategic plan. In fairness,
while GPRA required an annual departmental performance plan, it apparently
did not require performance or operating plans from the department's
constituent agencies. 43 However, a federated agency, like the Labor
Department, necessarily operates through its constituent parts. It would be very
difficult, if not impossible, to develop a genuine departmental performance plan
without building on agency operating plans. In a world of responsible
management, the departmental performance plan would amalgamate and
summarize its agencies' performance plans. But that seemingly did not happen
in the Labor Department prior to 2009. There was nothing to amalgamate. In
other words, the department had achieved seeming GPRA compliance without
actually managing well and responsibly throughout the department.
Three brief anecdotes about the condition of the Labor Department's
performance in 2009 will demonstrate how these weaknesses in the
department's performance management and measurement system were
associated with bad outcomes for workers.
i.

Wage & HourDivision (Wage & Hour)

Wage & Hour administers the nation's minimum wage, overtime, and
child labor law-the Fair Labor Standards Act4 4 -as well as the Family and
Medical Leave Act 45 and two prevailing wage laws for federal contractors. One

42

The staff s sheepishness may have been the product of their accurate reading of my body

language that I wanted meaningful management reports rather than glossy reports-to-report. In
their defense, it must have been difficult to dedicate themselves to producing a report that
Congress, OMB, and the public, not to mention the agency's leadership, would not read. Further,
OMB and GPRA included an extensive number of requirements for these reports such that even
the best intentioned performance staff would have found it difficult to produce an accessible,
rational, and worthwhile report.
43
See supra Part II.A. 1 for a discussion of GPRA's requirements.
44
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2013).
45
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2013).
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of the principal means by which Wage & Hour enforces these laws is to accept
complaints from workers who believe they have not received pay or leave to
which they are entitled. In addition to investigations it initiates on its own,
Wage & Hour investigates seemingly valid complaints. If violations are found,
Wage & Hour collects the workers' pay and returns it to them. In appropriate
cases, it might seek to impose liquidated damages or civil money penalties on
the law-breaking employer.46 The expectation is not merely that Wage & Hour
will remedy the instant violation, but that requiring the payment of unpaid
wages and the potential imposition of penalties will deter future violations.
In 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), an independent
auditing arm of Congress, issued a scathing report essentially finding that Wage
& Hour was performing this basic part of its job poorly.47 Operating
undercover, GAO filed 10 typical worker complaints with Wage & Hour's
local offices across the country. Wage & Hour staff deterred these "workers"
from filing complaints by encouraging them to resolve the issue themselves,
directing most calls to voicemail, not returning phone calls to both employees
and employers, and providing conflicting or misleading information about how
to file a complaint. Wage & Hour policies required investigators to enter all
reasonable complaints into Wage & Hour's database. Half of GAO's fictitious
complaints were not so recorded. Looking beyond its undercover cases, GAO
identified 20 real-life cases affecting at least 1,160 employees whose
complaints were inadequately investigated by Wage & Hour. Five of the cases
were closed based on false information provided by the employer that could
have been verified by a search of public records to which Wage & Hour staff
did not have access. GAO also found that Wage & Hour's investigations were
often delayed by months or years, partly because backlogs in some offices
prevented investigators from initiating cases within six months.48 In sum,
whether due to a lack of resources, poor management, inappropriate
performance measures, ineffective systems, or underqualified or uninterested
employees, Wage & Hour had failed to collect and act upon information and
complaints from vulnerable workers who believed their rights had been
violated.
ii. Office of Federal ContractCompliancePrograms (OFCCP)
OFCCP enforces workplace anti-discrimination and affirmative action
laws that apply specially to federal contractors and their subcontractors. Its
performance problem was not a failure of competence. Rather, OFCCP's

46

Fair Labor Standards Act § 216(b).

47

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,

GAO-09-458T,

DEP'T OF LABOR: WAGE AND HOUR

DIVISION'S COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES LEAVE Low WAGE WORKERS
VULNERABLE TO WAGE THEFT (2009), availableat http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/122107.pdf.
48
Id. at 23.
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leadership under the Bush Administration had adopted management policies
designed to inhibit finding and remedying workplace discrimination.
In most enforcement agencies, investigators go to the site of the alleged
violation, review evidence, and interview potential witnesses, among other
things, to determine the underlying facts. Prior to 2010, OFCCP investigators
were directed not to conduct on-site reviews of workplaces. Instead, they were
permitted to conduct only "desk audits," which essentially consisted of
reviewing employer-provided documents at their desks. Desk audits that
revealed compelling evidence of systemic discrimination would lead not to an
on-site investigation, but to a further desk audit. But a "notice of violation"
could be issued only after an on-site review. In the Orwellian world of poor
management of government resources, this was called the "Active Case
Management" system. 9
The result was a system that only very rarely found workplace
discrimination and often turned away cases that might have involved
discrimination. After we instituted a new performance management regime in
OFCCP, we learned that the agency's investigators made technical mistakes in
more than 40% of their cases and substantive errors in about 25% of their
cases. So, even in the rare instances when OFCCP stumbled upon workplace
discrimination, there was an unacceptably high risk that OFCCP investigators
would miss or ignore it.
iii. Mine Safety andHealth Administration (MSHA)
As noted above, MSHA protects the health and safety of miners and
people working in sand and gravel pits, among other workplaces. In 2009,
MSHA had been without an Assistant Secretary confirmed by the U.S. Senate
for five years. ° The employee who was in charge of this more-than-2,000person organization when I arrived at the Labor Department in 2009 was a
dedicated, but temporary, career executive whose most recent experience was
running the Birmingham, Alabama, district office.
During this time, MSHA suffered employee turnover so severe that a
large majority of its investigators and front-line supervisors had less than five
years of experience.5 1 Like most professional jobs, greater experience
contributes significantly to greater effectiveness, more skills, and broader

49

OFFICE OF FED. CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ACTIVE CASE

MANAGEMENT PROCESS & PROCEDURES No. 285 (2008).
50
Kathy Snyder, Stickler's Arithmetic, MNESAFETYWATCH (Mar. 31,

2008, 1:01 PM),

http://minesafetywatch.blogspot.com/2008/03/sticklers-arithmetic.html.
51

MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, INTERNAL REVIEW OF MSHA's

ACTIONS AT THE UPPER BIG BRANCH MINE-SOUTH 4 (2012) [hereinafter UPPER BIG BRANCH

REVIEW], available at http://www.msha.gov/performancecoal/UBBInternalReview/UBBIntemal
ReviewReportNoappx.pdf.
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knowledge for mine safety and health inspectors. Only a few months after
President Obama nominated, and the Senate confirmed, a new Assistant
Secretary for MSHA, the Upper Big Branch mine in West Virginia exploded
and 29 miners were killed-the worst mine disaster in 40 years.52 MSHA
certainly did not cause that mine explosion and kill those miners. Massey
Energy Company, the owner of Upper Big Branch, did. 53 But MSHA's own
internal review said that the inexperience of the investigators and supervisors
who inspected Upper Big Branch resulted in Massey Energy Company getting
away with violations of law that should not have been permitted. 54 Perhaps
worse, Upper Big Branch was not the first mine disaster under the Bush
Administration's watch. Two serious mine accidents in 2006, Sago and
Aracoma, also caused the deaths of multiple miners. The Crandall Canyon
mine collapse in 2007 not only killed miners working in the mine, but also
produced an ill-considered and poorly managed MSHA effort to rescue miners
that caused additional deaths.55
In sum, while the Labor Department largely complied with GPRA's
technical requirements, it did not achieve high-quality performance in several
of its largest and most important agencies. I have offered three examples, but
there are others. While some parts of the Labor Department were well-managed
and high performing leading up to 2009, GPRA could not claim credit for these
results, as these agencies' systems pre-dated the statute. GPRA certainly did
not avoid bad outcomes and bad performance in the remaining agencies. The
next section posits reasons for GPRA's failures across large parts of the Labor
Department.

52
Ian Urbina, No Survivors Found at Site of W.Va. Mine Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20l0/04/10/us/lOwestvirginia.html?page
wanted=all&_r=0.
53
UPPER BIG BRANCH REVIEW, supra note 51, at 1.
54

Id. at 26.

55

See ELLIOT P. LEWIS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,

MSHA ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRAM COAL
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH MANAGEMENT LETTER No. 05-06-007-06-001 (2006), available at
http://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2006/05-06-007-06-OO1.pdf; MINE SAFETY & HEALTH
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, INTERNAL REVIEW OF MSHA's ACTIONS AT THE ARACOMA ALMA
MINE #1 (2007), available at http://www.msha.gov/readroom/FOIA/20071ntemalReviews/
Aracoma%20Intemal%20Review%20Report.pdf, MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, INTERNAL REVIEW OF MSHA's ACTIONS AT THE SAGO MINE (2007),

available at http://www.msha.gov/Readroom/FOIAJ2007IntemalReviews/Sago%201nternal%20
Review%20Report.pdf; see also Steven Greenhouse, Report Cites Mine-Safety Agency Failures,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, at 124, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/us/
181abor.html; Matthew Davis, US Mining Safety Under Scrutiny, BBC NEWS (Jan. 5, 2006, 9:52
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4585482.stm; William M. Welch, Rescuers Pulled
from Mine Indefinitely After Cave-In Kills 3, USA TODAY (Aug. 19, 2007), http://usatoday30.
usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-08-16-utah-mineN.htm.
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C. GPRA's Failingsand the GPRAMA's FailureTo Fix Them
The glib answer to the question, "why didn't the Labor Department
perform better under GPRA" would be to blame the ideology or leadership of
Secretary Elaine Chao and the Bush Administration. But, like most glib
answers, this approach would not take us very far. If the leadership of the Labor
Department or any other executive branch agency is not carrying out its
organization's mission, then an effective performance management system
should disclose this fact and create mechanisms for holding leaders
accountable. This is the very heart of GPRA: disclosure to Congress, and to a
lesser extent the public, so that performance will be a part of the congressional
debate about the role of government, the effectiveness of particular government
programs, and the competence of particular governmental leaders. Again,
GPRA failed. The first section will discuss five important reasons why it failed.
The second section will explain that the GPRAMA-legislation intended to
reform GPRA-did not fix these failures.
1. GPRA's Failings
i.

No CongressionalAccountability

Ironically, in a system that is intended to create greater governmental
accountability, GPRA neglected to hold Congress accountable for overseeing
the GPRA process. As a result, executive branch entities like the Labor
Department were able to get away with poor performance and pro forma GPRA
compliance because they knew Congress was not paying attention. GPRA
required agencies to consult with Congress regarding their strategic plans and
little else.5 6 But Congress's laissez-faire attitude was not inevitable. Congress
could have expressly mandated in GPRA that each of its authorizing
committees or appropriations sub-committees hold at least one annual hearing
on agencies' compliance with and performance under GPRA. In preparation for
these hearings, or even without the hearings, Congress could have directed the
GAO or each agency's Inspector General to conduct annual audits of every
agency's compliance and performance, rather than merely directing the GAO to
produce one government-wide report on GPRA compliance in 1997. s7 Instead,
Congress chose to require nothing of itself.

56

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62,

§ 3(d), 107 Stat.

285, 286 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.).
57
Id. § 8. GAO has issued a series of general reports about aspects of GPRA and the
GPRMA, but none like those for which I am advocating. See Managing for Results in
Government, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/key-issues/managing_

for resultsingovernment/issue summary#t-1 (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) (listing reports).
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Closely related, there are no consequences for an agency's failure to
comply or for its poor performance. Budgets are not cut, and programs are not
eliminated. Appropriations decisions in Congress are driven more by ideology
and constituency politics than evidence.5 8 But even if performance data were to
drive government spending decisions, it would be hard to argue that these
sanctions are directed at the agency's decision-makers and managers rather
than the programs' beneficiaries. Decision-makers remain unscathed in either
event. There is no requirement that political appointees and senior career
leaders suffer discipline for a failure to comply with GPRA or poor
programmatic or departmental performance. In the absence of congressional
oversight and third-party audits, there is not even a shaming sanction.
Similarly, there are no rewards in GPRA for compliance or outstanding
governmental performance.
The same appropriations decision-making process that sustains poor
performing programs also starves the best performing programs when they do
not have sufficient political support. Top managers are given few incentives to
improve performance. Bonuses for political appointees are closely scrutinized
and generally disfavored.5 9 GPRA says nothing about rewarding senior career
managers when their programs provide excellent service to the American
people or save taxpayers money. With a near total absence of rewards and
punishments, it is easy-even rational-to achieve pro forma compliance, like
the Labor Department had prior to 2009, without actually producing goodquality government performance.

See generally John Bridgeland & Peter Orszag, Can Government Play Moneyball?,
ATLANTIC (June 19, 2013, 10:05 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/07/
can-govemment-play-moneyball/309389/ (discussing Congress's unwillingness to eliminate
programs even when there is evidence demonstrating the programs' ineffectiveness).
59
5 U.S.C. § 4508 (2012) prohibits bonuses to political appointees from June 1 of a
presidential election year through the President's inauguration. After a scandal involving bonuses
during the President George H.W. Bush Administration, President Clinton's chief of staff issued
a memorandum urging agencies to refrain from giving bonuses to political appointees, although a
GAO report found that some Clinton Administration appointees received such bonuses. See
Tanya N. Ballard, Despite Prohibition,Clinton Appointees Got Bonuses, GOV'T EXECUTIVE (Dec.
13,
2002),
http://www.govexec.com/federal-news/2002/12/despite-prohibition-clintonappointees-got-bonuses/13111/. President George W. Bush allowed political appointees to
receive performance bonuses. See Eric Lichtblau, Bush Restoring Cash Bonuses for Appointees,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2002), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/04/us/bush-restoringcash-bonuses-for-appointees.html. President Obama froze all bonuses for political appointees.
See Scott Wilson, Obama Orders Freeze on Bonuses, Monetary Awards for Federal Political
Appointees, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/08/03/AR2010080306839.html.
60
See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
58

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss3/7

20

Harris: Managing for Social Change: Improving Labor Department Performanc

2015]

MANAGING SOCIAL CHANGE

1007

ii. No ClearDefinition of Success
GPRA is almost entirely silent about a definition of "success" for
executive branch performance. GPRA's "purposes" section uses phrases like
"waste," "inefficiency in Federal programs," "vital public needs," and
"improve program efficiency and effectiveness." 6' These phrases mean little to
agency staff attempting to set performance goals. By contrast, GPRA is specific
about its process requirements. As a result, it necessarily communicates to the
executive branch agencies that, to the extent they are judged at all, judgments
will be based on processes rather than substance or practice. More directly,
GPRA ratifies pro forma compliance because it does not offer guidance
regarding the substance of compliance.
Admittedly, defining "success" for many government programs is
difficult. Organic statutes often offer broadly stated goals, but not specific
means of measuring achievement of those goals or any targets on the way to
achieving those goals. For example, the congressionally articulated purpose for
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, which created the Labor
Department's OSHA, is "to assure so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our
human resources. 62 How does OSHA know whether it has succeeded in
satisfying this congressional purpose? Should OSHA benchmark its
performance against other agencies, its own past performance, or some
guidepost in the economy? Merely counting up the number of workers killed,
injured, or ill in unsafe and unhealthy workplaces would fail to take into
account the limits on OSHA's jurisdiction and resources, as well as the ebbs
and flows of different industries over time in the U.S. economy even though
some jobs and some industries are demonstrably more dangerous and unhealthy
than others. It would also fail to accommodate any measure of the cost
effectiveness of OSHA's programs. Should OSHA measure lives and limbs
saved divided by appropriated dollars spent, for example? GPRA has nothing to
say about these important and difficult questions, and does not create a forum
for Congress, the executive branch, and the public to debate them.
iii. No Assurance that Agencies Use Data in Their DecisionMaking
Recall the story told above
performance report being a "report
document. While tacitly favoring pro
establish a means of looking behind
compliance and executive branch
61
62

about the Labor Department's annual
to report" rather than a management
forma compliance, GPRA also failed to
pro forma compliance to assess actual
performance. Yet, such means were

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 § 2.
29 U.S.C. § 65 1(b) (2013).
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available. First, every five years, GAO conducts a study to ask federal
executive branch managers whether their agencies use evidence-based, datadriven decision-making-in essence, asking managers if their agencies
implement strategic and operating plans and rely on the performance data
produced under GPRA.63 The survey asks a host of questions that directly and
indirectly disclose whether the agency manages its operations using the
performance data it reports, along with other evidence available in a fulsome
performance management and measurement system. The first such survey was
administered in 1996, that is, before the first GPRA strategic plans were
published. This survey could have been used as a means of validating agencies'
adoption of evidence-based, data-driven management practices, particularly if
the survey were administered annually and its results were translated for
Congress and the public.
Second, GPRA did not require the establishment of close connections
between agency performance and strategic plans, on the one hand, and the
individual performance plans of career managers and employees, on the other.
Every federal employee must have an individual performance plan that details
the elements of good performance in his or her job.64 Employees' supervisors
and managers are required to use these elements to review the employees'
performance at least annually. Raises and bonuses, or demotions and
discharges, can result from these performance reviews. Yet, when Congress
enacted GPRA, it did not amend the longstanding statutory provisions
establishing and regulating this performance review process to require a direct
connection between individual and agency performance.
The Office of Personnel Management regulations that implement the
individual performance review statute specifically require agencies to consider
GPRA results in Senior Executive Services (SES) managers' performance
review. However, the regulations treat GPRA results as only 'one part of the
process. There are five criteria, including customer satisfaction; "[e]mployee
perspectives"; "[t]he effectiveness, productivity, and performance quality of the
employees for whom the senior executive is responsible"; and affirmative
action, equal employment opportunity, and diversity goals. 65 In other words, it
is conceivable under the literal terms of the regulations that a SES manager
could get a good, or very good, performance rating without having helped her
agency achieve good or very good performance. Equally important, there is no
requirement in the regulations that front-line employees (so-called "GS" or
"GM" employees) are judged based on agency performance.

63

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-519SP, 2013 FEDERAL MANAGERS SURVEY

ON ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE

AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES

(2013), http://www.gao.gov/

special.pubs/gao- 13-519sp/index.htm.
64
5 U.S.C. § 4302 (2013).
65
5 C.F.R. § 430.307(a)(2) (2013).
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iv. FailureTo Require Evidence of Relationships Between Outputs
and Outcomes
There are several different kinds of performance metrics employed by
agencies. According to GPRA, outcome measures offer "an assessment of the
results of a program activity compared to its intended purpose., 66 In other
words, like MSHA's mining fatalities metric, they measure the real-world
effects of government programs as compared with their intended effects.
Output measures describe the level of activity or the number of activities
produced by a government program over a specified period.67 An agency's
outputs are supposed to produce its designated outcomes.
Yet, many agencies have great difficulty measuring outcomes. Even
defining outcomes can be difficult. For example, OFCCP enforces workplace
anti-discrimination and affirmative action laws that apply to federal contractors.
Is OFCCP's outcome supposed to be federal contractor workforces that more
closely approximate the demographics of the labor markets from which they
are hiring-the classic definition of affirmative action's beneficial effects? 68 Or
is OFCCP's outcome supposed to be federal contractors' compliance with the
laws it administers? If it is the latter, how should OFCCP measure this
outcome? The agency undertakes compliance evaluations of roughly 2% of the
universe of federal contractors covered by the laws OFCCP administers. How
can it know from its evaluation of this small, non-randomly selected subset of
the contractor universe whether compliance among all federal contractors is
increasing? The fact is that OFCCP, and those who oversee its performance,
cannot know on a quarter-by-quarter or year-by-year basis whether compliance
is increasing or decreasing. Further, how can we know whether it is OFCCP's
interventions, as opposed to exogenous factors, that changed the compliance
rate in any given year or overall? From the available performance measures, we
cannot.
GPRA acknowledges this fact by requiring that agencies' strategic
plans include a description of the program evaluations it has used to set goals
and objectives, along with a schedule for future program evaluations.6 9
Performance evaluations are essentially social science studies of the
relationship between outputs and outcomes, among other things. 7 ) However,
GPRA does not require program evaluations where outcome-focused
performance measures are difficult or impossible. Rather, it requires only that,
when agencies choose to undertake program evaluations, they report them in
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Government Performance and Results Act, 31 U.S.C. § 11 15(h)(7) (1993).

67

Id. § 1115(h)(8).
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See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).

69

Government Performance and Results Act, 5 U.S.C. § 306(a)(8) (1993).
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Government Performance and Results Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1115(h)(7).
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their multi-year strategic plans. Agencies were permitted, under the GPRA
structure, to report output measures without any hypothesis or evidence about
the connection between the output and its intended outcome.
v.

Complexity of the Mandate

GPRA requires the creation of a performance plan for every "program
activity" in each agency. 7' In essence, this requirement imposes an obligation
to set performance targets for each line of the federal budget.72 But the budget
of the U.S. government's executive branch agencies is dizzyingly diverse and
eye-glazingly complex to the point of frustrating this requirement. Again, the
Labor Department offers a helpful example. Wage & Hour, which spent around
$229 million in fiscal year 2013, has one budget activity. OFCCP, which spent
more than $100 million, also has only one budget activity. By contrast, OSHA
has ten, MSHA has eight, and ETA has dozens.7 3 So, OSHA and MSHA were
technically required to produce a performance target for their "compliance
assistance" activities (i.e., help for employers to bring them into compliance
with employment laws) because they have budget line items funding that
activity. Wage & Hour and OFCCP, technically speaking, were not required to
establish a performance target for the same activity. ETA was expected to have
dozens, even hundreds, of performance measures across its many programs.
Perhaps with this complex diversity in mind, GPRA allows agencies, in
consultation with OMB, to offer alternative forms of measurement, or to
"aggregate, disaggregate, or consolidate program activities," as long as "any
aggregation or consolidation may not omit or minimize the significance of any
' 74
program activity constituting a major function or operation for the agency."
In the case of the Labor Department, the budget's complexity and the laxity in
Congress's direction and oversight allowed two-thirds of the department's
agencies to avoid creating annual operating/performance plans and effectively
avoid establishing performance goals for many of their functions.75
2. GPRAMA's Failure To Fix GPRA's Failings
As its description in the earlier part of this section should make clear,
the GPRAMA did not fix these five failings of GPRA. In particular, the

71

Id. § ll15(b).

72

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-734SP, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN THE

FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 77 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-0734SP.
73 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUDGET IN BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2014 62, 65, 6-7 (2013),
www.dol.gov/dol/budget/2014/PDF/FY2014BIB.pdf.
74 Government Performance and Results Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1115(d).
75 See supra Part II.B.2 for my earlier discussion of this point.
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GPRAMA did not aggressively assert congressional oversight of the GPRA
process. There is no mandate regarding oversight hearings or GAO or Inspector
General audits of agencies' annual performance plans. There is no
interpretation or analysis of agencies' self-reporting of their performance at all.
The GPRAMA did include a slight ratcheting up of congressional involvement.
While GPRA had only generally required agencies to consult with Congress
when developing their strategic plans,76 the GPRAMA required congressional
consultations "when developing or making adjustments to a strategic plan" and
specified "including majority and minority views from the appropriate
authorizing, appropriations, and oversight committees .... ,, Thus, Congress
sought engagement in agencies' mission definition and goal-setting, but
continued to abstain from playing a significant role in holding agencies
accountable for their performance against their goals.
One provision in the GPRAMA seemingly moved Congress closer to a
meaningful role in a performance accountability system. The GPRAMA
requires OMB to determine whether the agencies' program activities have met
their performance goals and objectives outlined in the agency performance
plan. When performance goals are not met, OMB is expected to submit a report
to the Senate's Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
(HSGAC) and the House's Committee on Oversight and Governmental Reform
(COGR), as well as GAO. 78 If underperformance persists for more than one
fiscal year, the GPRAMA requires further reports from OMB describing
remediation plans, requesting more money, seeking authority to move already
budgeted money to those underperforming programs, or proposing statutory
reforms or elimination of the program.79
Superficially, these requirements represent the kind of congressional
oversight that should hold agencies accountable for compliance and improving
performance. But any deeper inquiry discloses that these reforms were simply
more of the same. For example, note Congress's passivity in its putative
oversight role. The committees responsible for general government operations
receive information and plans from OMB, but there is no obligation imposed
on the committees to act or even investigate when they are notified about
performance problems. There is no reason to believe that these reports will be
used for any purpose other than dust collection on congressional bookshelves
or, perhaps worse, as tools for partisan attacks on disfavored programs. This
concern is heightened by the fact that the specified committees are not the right
forums for congressional action on most programs' performance. Their staffs

76

See Government Performance and Results Act, 5 U.S.C. § 306 (1993).

GPRA Modernization Act, 5 U.S.C. § 306(d) (2013). The same consultation requirement is
imposed on the OMB Director in the process of choosing priority goals. 31 U.S.C. § 1120
(2013).
78 31 U.S.C. § 1116(f).
77
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Id. § 1116(g).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2015

25

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 117, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 7
1012

WEST VIRGINIA LAW RE VIE W

[Vol. 117

and members do not have the requisite expertise to participate meaningfully in
reforming the hundreds of government programs that are outside their
jurisdiction. Should HSGAC and COGR debate how to improve America's job
training system for dislocated workers or should the Senate HELP and House
Education and Workforce Committees? What about mine safety and health or
pensions? If HSGAC and COGR were to attempt to dive into these issues, or
any others arising out of the Labor Department, these authorizing committees
would certainly and justifiably complain about infringements on their
jurisdiction. Worse than congressional infighting, HSGAC and COGR simply
do not have the competence to undertake substantive reform of these programs.
While it is conceivable that HSGAC and COGR could function like
clearinghouses referring performance issues to the appropriate authorizing
committees, the GPRAMA neither requires nor encourages them to do so.
Perhaps most starkly, HSGAC and COGR do not decide the budget or
appropriations questions that the GPRAMA requires OMB to submit to them.
Answering those questions is the responsibility of the Senate and House Budget
and Appropriations Committees. If Congress were serious about performance
management, and moving toward performance-based budgeting as GPRA
suggested it would, then the budget and appropriations committees would be at
the center of the discussion. They are not. The best interpretation is that the
centrality of HSGAC and COGR to this purported oversight process is yet more
evidence that GPRA and the GPRAMA elevate form over substance. The
GPRAMA created a dead end for performance information, not a true path to
congressional oversight of executive branch performance.
The GPRAMA's path to performance accountability did not lead to
Capitol Hill. Instead, the GPRAMA delegated Congress's oversight role to
others. The first group was the deputy secretaries of each department, newly
dubbed "Chief Operating Officers" (COOs). 80 The second overseer is OMB.
The third overseer is the public. But the delegation to the first two groups-or,
more precisely, the obligation imposed-was only partial. The COOs were
required to meet quarterly with the responsible officials in their agencies to
review performance, but only with respect to the agency's "priority goals.'
The priority goal concept was apparently Congress's effort to emulate the
widely accepted practice in corporate America of focusing performance
management on "key performance indicators" that capture an organization's
achievement of the goals that drive its success.8 2 But Congress did not require a
priority goal for every program activity, every agency operating unit, or even
every major function in an agency. It left the requirement vague. As a result,
the Labor Department-with 23 operating units, a $12 billion discretionary
80

Id. § 1123.

81

Id. § 1121(b)(1).
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budget, and dozens and dozens of products-had only three priority goals after
the GPRAMA. 83 If I had followed the GPRAMA-mandated quarterly review
process during my time as the Labor Department's COO, I would not have
addressed most of the performance issues in the Labor Department and I would
never have met with most of the Labor Department's 84constituent agencies. The
GPRAMA requires very little oversight by the COOs.

The same problem limits the GPRAMA's direction to the OMB
Director. The Director is supposed to work with the agencies in the
development of the federal government's priority goals and to meet quarterly
with the agency officials in charge of those goals. During my time as COO
and Deputy Secretary, I never met with any of President Obama's OMB
Directors to discuss the Labor Department's priority goals. I was not the
responsible official for any of those goals, but I expect I would have been
invited to join those meetings as the department's COO and principal
performance overseer. 86 Even if those meetings had taken place, only three
goals would have been discussed and most of the Labor Department's
performance would have been ignored.
This leaves the public. The GPRAMA requires agencies to publish
their annual performance plans on a public web site every February and data
regarding actual performance within 150 days after the end of the federal
government's fiscal year (i.e., September 30th plus 150 days).8 7 Agencies'
annual performance plans are expected to address all of their performance
metrics for every program activity, not merely the so-called priority goals.
Thus, the public is provided with a reasonably complete picture of agency
performance on an annual basis. Congress gets only the bad news of unmet
performance goals.
The problem is that the public is being given too much unprocessed
data rather than actionable information. In particular, the GPRAMA did not
address GPRA's failure to define successful government performance so that
the public could judge actual performance against that definition. As a result, it
is difficult for the public to know whether a particular agency is performing
well or poorly. The public is told by each agency whether the agency has met
its targets, but the public has no way to know if these are the right targets or
why the targets were chosen. For example, because agencies have limited
resources, lower targets set for one activity may be necessitated by increased
83
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FISCAL YEAR 2013 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE
availableat www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/.
See 31 U.S.C. § 1120(b) (describing agency priority goals).
84
Id. §§ 1120(a)(1), 1121(a)(1).
85
86

REPORT

20 (2014),

In fairness to my former colleagues at OMB, my staff and I met annually with OMB senior

and budget staff to review the Labor Department's annual performance index, discussed infra in
text accompanying notes 104-05.
GPRA Modernization Act, 5 U.S.C. § 306(a); 31 U.S.C. § 11 16(b)(1).
87
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investments in another activity. In the Labor Department's employment law
enforcement agencies during the Obama Administration, an effort was made (to
the extent permitted by budget structures) to invest more resources in
enforcement by reducing spending on employer-focused compliance assistance.
Even if this strategy was apparent, the public would not have had a means of
knowing the extent to which it dictated performance targets related to
enforcement and compliance assistance.
Similarly, unless it performs the analysis itself, the public cannot know
whether a particular agency is meeting all or most of its targets. It is therefore
very difficult to know whether an agency is well managed, poorly managed, or
mediocre. There is no comparison across agencies or ranking of agencies'
performance. There is no requirement that agencies disclose trend lines in
performance in a manner that will allow the public to understand whether an
agency is improving. There is no summary tool that provides an assessment of
an agency's overall performance. Given the impenetrable complexity of the
federal budget, and particular agencies' budgets, the public cannot know
whether an agency is complying with the requirement to have goals and targets
for every program activity.
Of course, the public, like Congress, does not have access to tools that
disclose whether agencies used GPRA-generated data in their decision-making.
As noted above, the GAO survey of executive branch manager is produced
only every five years. As a result, agency performance that meets its target in
intervening years could be entirely the product of happenstance rather than
sound management or shrewd resource allocation. If a goal of GPRA is to
allow the public to determine whether its government is well-managed, the
mountain of data that the GPRAMA requires agencies to disclose to the public
does not necessarily provide the answer, at least not in the form presented.
Perhaps most problematic, the public cannot know or study the
relationships between agencies' outputs and the outcomes defined in their
strategic plans. For example, a sizable percentage of the data in the Labor
Department's annual performance reports relates to outputs: the number of
investigations undertaken by an employment law enforcement agency, the
quality of those investigations, the speed with which benefits checks are
distributed to workers compensation beneficiaries, the number of on-site
reviews of Job Corps centers, and the percentage of BLS data series produced
on time, to name just a few. 88 This is valuable information that tells the
observer whether the Labor Department is doing its job and whether its staff is
working hard. But these data do not disclose the real-world consequences of the
Labor Department doing its job. Ultimately, this is the most important
information: whether government is serving its customers and constituents.
Performance data may not provide this information to the public.

88

See generally U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FISCAL YEAR 2013 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT

(2014), availableat www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/ (listing these metrics and others).
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With all of these failings in GPRA and the GPRAMA, the public does
not have the tools it needs to serve as an effective overseer of the federal
government's performance. In section three, I will propose reforms to the
GPRAMA and actions that stakeholder groups can take that will remedy
Congress's failure to provide a meaningful system for overseeing government
performance. The next part will describe efforts by the Labor Department's
new leadership team to turn around the organization's performance beginning
in 2009. This story of an important performance management and measurement
success in a large and complex federal Cabinet department will further inform
and serve as something like a proof of concept for the reform agenda to be
described in section three.
III. TURNING AROUND THE LABOR DEPARTMENT'S PERFORMANCE

Despite compliance with GPRA, the Labor Department faced serious
management and performance challenges when I returned in 2009, as the
preceding section explained. The new Obama Administration leadership team
faced the challenge of turning around performance where it was failing without
interfering with good (even excellent) performance in other parts of the
department. We could not simply scrap everything that had come before and
start anew, as some new management teams feel compelled to do. Further,
while GPRA offered a worthwhile starting place for a performance turnaround
effort, the preceding section explained that it did not offer a complete answer. I
knew that Congress, and even OMB, were not going to hold the Labor
Department (or me) accountable for excellent performance. I also knew that we
would not face close, unsparing scrutiny from GAO and our IG on departmentwide performance despite the generally high quality of their work on particular
management issues.
Pro forma compliance with GPRA was not the only available option.
The Labor Department's new leadership team could choose to comply with the
law and also dramatically improve performance, as long as it understood that
achieving the former did not inevitably produce the latter. Better results for the
Labor Department's constituents would require the department's leaders to
hold themselves and each other accountable. Before describing the process by
which the Labor Department's leadership team established this measurement
and accountability system, it is worth noting that the team's members-like
many agency leadership teams in administrations of both parties-did not bring
substantial management experience to this task.
Many executive branch presidential appointees arrive at their jobs after
service as congressional staff (or members, at the Cabinet level), academics,
lawyers, political operatives, non-profit organization or foundation executives,
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think-tank leaders, or advocates. 89 Few have managed large or mid-size
organizations. Except those with prior executive branch or state or local
government experience, almost none have managed organizations as complex
and surrounded by politics as executive branch agencies. 90 As a result, these
presidential appointees do not bring formal management training, management
experience, or any particular interest in management to their roles as senior
federal managers. 9' They are typically hired for their policy expertise, their
political acumen, their appeal to important constituencies, or all three, rather
than their ability to measure and drive performance in a large bureaucracy.
Compounding this challenge, there is little management or performance
measurement training available for presidential appointees at any point during
their typically short tenures. It is easy for presidential appointees to delegate
management and measurement issues to their senior career executives and
concentrate solely on policy and political concerns. These facts magnify the
importance of the accomplishments of the Obama Labor Department's
leadership team recounted in this section. The team overcame not only a broken
congressional mandate, but their own lack of management expertise, to turn
around performance in their organization and better serve workers and other
constituents.
The first section below will describe the turnaround strategy
implemented by the Labor Department's leadership team beginning after 2009.
The second section will offer data and narrative demonstrating the strategy's
success through Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 and the real-world results it produced
for working families and others served by the Labor Department.
A.

The TurnaroundStrategy

Strategic Plan. The department needed an operational framework to
improve performance management. The starting place was the GPRAmandated strategic plan. In 2009, the department's most recent plan, drafted
under Secretary Chao, was set to expire. We chose to use this opportunityalong with a one-year delay to facilitate it-to re-think this governing
document for the department's performance. I was struck that the Chao
strategic plan differed little from the strategic plan that Secretary Alexis
89
In some administrations, this list would include lobbyists; however, President Obama
banned recent lobbyists from service in his administration except in very limited circumstances.
See Exec. Order No. 13490, 74 Fed. Reg. 467 (Jan. 21, 2009).
90
See supra Part I.B. 1 for discussion of the Labor Department's complexity. There is a rich
debate to be joined-although not in this Article-regarding whether government agencies are
more difficult to manage and complex than even the largest private-sector businesses. My view is
that government entities like the Labor Department are significantly more challenging, although I
admit that this perspective is biased by the experiences recounted in this Article.
91
I do not exempt myself from this observation. To the contrary, as discussed below, I may
have exemplified it.
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Herman had put in place during President Bill Clinton's second term with my
help. 92 It seemed unlikely, to say the least, that a center-left Democrat and a
conservative Republican would have the same vision and goals for an
organization that finds itself at the center of so many partisan struggles and
controversial issues. Certainly, the public perception was that Secretary Chao
led the Labor Department in a very different direction from Secretary
Herman. 93 The more likely explanation for the similarity in the two secretaries'
strategic plans was that these strategic plans mattered very little or not at all to
the day-to-day management of the department during Chao's tenure.
The strategic plan is a leadership document. It sets forth the leadership
team's vision, or "mission" in GPRA terms, for the organization. We scrapped
the four-part, overgeneralized framework in the existing departmental strategic
plan for a simple and capacious vision statement: "Good Jobs for Everyone." 94
This vision statement gave us the opportunity to define "good jobs" as
consisting of those things that the Labor Department's agencies existed to
create: skills training and job placement assistance; safe and healthy
workplaces; workplaces free of discrimination; jobs with pensions and health
care; a safety net when people leave their jobs due to layoffs, illness or injury,
or retirement; and a voice for workers in workplace decision-making, among
others. 95 "For everyone" allowed us to focus on the department's efforts to
ensure equal opportunity and fair treatment for workers of color, women
workers, workers with disabilities, veterans, immigrant workers, and workers in
other countries. This portion of our vision statement fit very well with
Secretary Solis's enthusiastic embrace of stakeholder communities and her
commitment to ensure that those who had not been included in policymaking
decisions in the past would be included during her leadership of the Labor
Department.
Outcome Goals. In the language of GPRA, we deduced the
department's and agencies' outcome goals from the vision statement and laid
them out in the strategic plan. 96 We conceived these outcome goals to be the
department's promises to the people and organizations it serves, as well as the

92

Compare U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 1999-2004 (2000),

available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924092386634, with U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2006-2011 (2006) (on file with author). I served as
Counselor to the Secretary during President Clinton's second term.
93 See Steven Greenhouse, DepartingSecretary of Labor Fends Off Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
9, 2009, at A12, available at www.nytimes.com/2009/01/10/washington/l0chao.html; Profile:
Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao, ABC NEWS (Nov. 1, 2005), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
Inauguration/story?id=1 22080.
94 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2011-2016 at ii (2010),
www.dol.gov/-sec/stratplan/StrategicPlan.pdf
95
Id.
96
Id. at 9.
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public, Congress, and the President. We felt we needed a persuasive response
to the question, how does the Labor Department make your life, American
society, and the American economy better? What outcomes should it produce
for you? Although we did not use this lexicon, these promises were the Labor
Department's key performance indicators-the goals that could be said to
define whether the department had succeeded in carrying out its mission. 97
However, we also acknowledged that we could not always connect our
agencies' every-day activities to outcomes that our constituents would feel in
their daily lives.
Program Evaluation. As noted above, the department's outputs do not
always self-evidently result in outcomes that are experienced by workers,
employers, and other stakeholders and regulated entities. For this reason, in
2010, we established the Labor Department's first Office of the Chief
Evaluation Officer. 98 This office, led in succession by two of the nation's best
known and best respected program evaluation experts, 99 was charged with
helping each agency to develop a five-year "learning plan" largely dedicated to
developing evidence of how each agency's strategies and outputs produced
either the outcomes promised in the strategic plan or similar and equally
important outcomes. We also dramatically expanded the departmental budget
for program evaluation with additional funds available through a new budget
set-aside authority Congress approved for the department. At its core, this
program evaluation agenda existed to gather evidence useful to holding the
department, its agencies, and its staff accountable to the promises in the
strategic plan and statutory goals and objectives.
Operating Plans. Program evaluations can take years to complete.
Responsible leaders of large organizations cannot wait two or three years to
hold their staffs accountable for their performance. The solution to this
challenge was to require almost every agency in the department to have an
annual operating plan. The operating plan served two purposes. First, it was the
place where agencies articulated the connection between their day-to-day
strategies and their outputs and the outcomes they expected to produce,
including those promised in the departmental strategic plan. We required every
agency operating plan to include either evidence of the causal connection
between the strategies in the plan and the desired outcomes, or a testable
hypothesis of that connection. The program evaluations listed in the agency's
learning plan would test those hypotheses. For example, if an agency leadership
team believed that teaching workers about worker protection laws would
increase employers' compliance with the law (as some did), we required

97
98

See discussion in text accompanying note 82.
See Harris, supra note 3.

99
The Labor Department's two Chief Evaluation Officers: Professor Jean Grossman of
Princeton University, who established the office, and Demetra Nightingale of the Urban Institute,
who continues to lead the office at the time of this writing.
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evidence of that causal relationship, or a testable hypothesis and a plan to test
that hypothesis through program evaluation. We also built a maturity model to
assess agencies' progress in this regard.
Second, the operating plan was our principal accountability tool. It
catalogued all of the agency's activities and set both quarterly and annual
targets for each activity with an output measure or, if possible, an outcome
measure. We did not allow ourselves to get bogged down in GPRA's
definitional challenges of what constituted a budgetary program activity. Every
activity that mattered to carrying out the agency's mission had to be measured.
Any program or activity that was not being measured, by definition, should be
considered for elimination because it was not important, with the exception of a
smaller number of administrative activities. Returning to the same example, if
an agency believes that educating workers about worker protection laws
produces more compliance among employers, then the agency propounding
that hypothesis was required to report how many workers it had educated about
worker protection laws in each quarter and over the course of a year. But it was
also required to report how many workplace investigations it planned to
conduct, and what percentage of its activities met a specified quality standard,
among other things. Targets set in isolation for individual activities do not
disclose an agency's priorities and its strategies for achieving desired
outcomes. The operating plan had to provide a complete picture of
performance, not a mere focus on a few highlighted activities.
Three important points about the operating plans should be highlighted.
Point number one: I required every agency, except for the smallest service
agencies and our four groups ofjudges,' 00 to have an operating plan. They were
the centerpieces of our performance management system and our best means of
holding agency leaders and staff accountable. The problem that GPRA
permitted-two-thirds of the Labor Department's operating units did not have
an annual performance or operating plan in 2009-could not be allowed to
continue. It did not. When I left the department, 17 of 19 operating units
(excluding the adjudicative boards) had operating plans. If planning for
performance improves performance, then everyone had to have a plan.
Point number two: agencies were required to plan for continuous
improvement in their operating plans. The agencies were required to set an
annual target for every measure that was above the average of the agency's last
five years of actual performance on that same measure (or however many years
up to five for which the agency had data). We did not require year-over-year

100

The Labor Department's adjudicative bodies are data-driven organizations with a firm

grasp on their workloads, productivity, and the quality of their products. However, the nature of
their work made prioritization and targeting very difficult, if not impossible. Nonetheless, I held
quarterly meetings with the chief judges of the adjudicative bodies in which we discussed various
strategies for addressing backlogs and other issues. But operating plans for this purpose would
not have made sense.
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improvement because too many exogenous factors-for example, unexpected
increases in workload, natural disasters like Hurricane Sandy, human-made
disasters like the Deepwater Horizon oil spill or the Upper Big Branch mine
explosion, or surprising actions by Congress or other institutions-could
intervene in any given year. Instead, we required an improvement trend
demonstrated by surpassing the average of past performance. However, we
permitted one category of exceptions to this rule. If the agency's leadership had
decided to deemphasize an activity, then the agency could set a target below the
average of past performance. In fact, we insisted on it. We wanted agency
heads to prioritize, spend fewer resources on low priority activities, and invest
more in high priority activities. For example, as noted above, the Obama
Administration prioritized enforcement of employment laws and education of
workers about employment laws above employer-focused compliance
assistance activities. Accordingly, employment law enforcement agencies were
permitted to reduce targets for employer-focused compliance activities. As will
be discussed below, this prioritization process was particularly important to
proper budget formulation, especially when it became apparent that most
budgets in the department would remain flat or decrease during much of my
post-2010 tenure.
Even before Congress enacted it in the GPRAMA, we rejected a
definition of "success" focused on meeting or beating performance targets.
Particularly in the form included in the GPRAMA, this approach creates the
wrong incentives. Recall that the GPRAMA requires OMB to report to
Congress about any agency that fails to meet its performance goals and
objectives. Agencies repeatedly failing to meet particular performance goals
must submit remediation, budget, and reform plans that OMB would share with
Congress. No agency wants to be the subject of a report to Congress about
failed performance. It is embarrassing for the agency's leaders and, despite
Congress's passivity on performance management issues, drastically increases
the risk of partisan attacks on programs' budgets, activities, purposes, and
leaders. So, agencies will certainly set their targets at low levels which their
leaders know they can easily achieve to avoid being included in this "failure
report" to Congress. This is entirely rational behavior, at least in a political
environment, but it also hurts performance.
Most employees seek to perform in a manner that meets or slightly
exceeds their employer's expectations. Low targets will mean low levels of
performance or, more precisely, performance below the level that could be
achieved with a more rational and aggressive targeting system. There are times
when it is appropriate for agency leaders to set "stretch goals" that urge their
employees to work harder, reengineer business processes, or reallocate
resources to produce more in the coming year than has ever been produced
before. I used this approach relentlessly with the Labor Department's
leadership team in the firm belief that pushing targets higher generally forces
positive change inside an organization. Even if the stretch goal is not reached,
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performance is likely to improve, and improve dramatically. I often told our
leadership team that I preferred that they receive an "A-" on a stretch goal than
an "A+" for exceeding a goal that lacked ambition. Of course, better
performance is the goal of this entire enterprise, but the stretch-goals strategy
for achieving better performance would be punished under the GPRAMA with
the shaming sanction of an OMB report to Congress. It is entirely irrational and
self-defeating to expect federal managers to put themselves in the difficult
position of trying to explain these kinds of results to OMB and Congress.
Point number three: we sought to construct a "balanced scorecard" for
each agency over time. 101 In the corporate world, the balanced scorecard
represented a move away from an exclusive focus on bottom-line financial
measures toward a more holistic assessment of organizational performance. It
focuses on four distinct categories of measures: financial, customer response,
internal process and production, and innovation and learning. We sought to
adapt this approach to the particularized needs of the Labor Department. For
Fiscal Year 2011, we focused on the development of a comprehensive set of
production measures in every agency that would capture the quantity and
timeliness (where appropriate) of every product and process promised by the
agency in its operating plan. This effort necessarily produced a mix of outcome,
output, and process measures. Because of many agencies' missions, the mix
included diverse measures of policy outputs, law enforcement activities,
outreach efforts, customer service operations, and others products.
For Fiscal Year 2012, we worried that an excessive focus on quantity
would drive down quality. Accordingly, we encouraged every agency to pair
each quantity and timeliness measure with a quality measure. Several agencies,
including OFCCP and ETA's Trade Adjustment Assistance program (TAA
program), developed "protocol fidelity" quality measures. In essence, the
agencies identified the necessary steps to generating one of their products
(investigations for OFCCP, certifications of benefit applications for the TAA
program) and then assessed the percentage of instances in which employees
followed each step of the protocol. We also required agencies to include some
measure of customer satisfaction in their operating plans and, in November
2013, established a Customer Service Program Office to support the agencies.
For Fiscal Year 2013, we incorporated a comprehensive set of administrative
measures into the operating plans: financial management, human resources,
information technology, procurement services, and other business functions.
Accountability System. Where GPRA, and later the GPRAMA, did not
impose a thoroughgoing accountability system, we did. Every quarter, in my
role as Chief Operating Officer, I held people accountable. I convened
quarterly meetings with every agency head to review every measure in their
operating plans, not just the very few "priority goals" contemplated by the
101
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GPRAMA. Agency heads would report on whether their agencies' actual
performance during the quarter and year-to-date met, missed, or exceeded their
targets. But we would also have rich, detailed discussions about strategies,
tactics, resources, and priorities. We would discuss whether measures should be
scrapped or added, and we would discuss evaluations being conducted that
related to various measures. I would push for ever higher performance and
performance targets, and the agency heads and their leadership teams would
push back-often very convincingly-by explaining the unintended
consequences of higher targets or excessive focus in one area or another. These
quarterly performance meetings were not lovefests. I was blunt and, within the
constraints that exist in any hierarchical organization, so were the agency
leadership teams. But I promised everyone involved that I would never impose
the death penalty on anybody for missing a quarterly or annual target. The
worst thing that happened was they had to have a further discussion with me,
which some of my colleagues compared unfavorably to being subjected to the
death penalty.
The importance of my deep involvement in the process, playing the
role of Chief Operating Officer, cannot be overstated. It was not because I
brought a brilliant management mind with uncanny insights into organizational
transformation. I did not. I had been a law professor before becoming Deputy
Secretary, and my only previous management experience had been leading the
Labor Department's small policy office and a few dozen employees during the
Clinton Administration. I had no formal training in management, much less
performance management. So, it was not me. It was the fact that the person
holding the title of Deputy Secretary was involved, reading and annotating all
of the briefing memos, reviewing and commenting upon the charts disclosing
each agency's performance, attending every meeting, asking a long list of
questions, and opining about how we could all achieve the Labor Department's
mission. It was the Hawthorne effect-my observation of and engagement in
the process helped to change behavior. 102
Another powerful force was the deep involvement of the department's
agency heads and their willingness, whether voluntary or in response to the
pressure I applied, to take personal responsibility for operational excellence.
Each assistant secretary or agency director became deeply knowledgeable
about and invested in his or her agency's operations, their successes, and their
failures. Agency heads evaluated how the senior career managers who reported
102 At the same time, it is essential not to excessively personalize this success. The systems

described in this Article required a sizable undertaking that involved coordination by a dedicated
central staff of performance and budget experts and performance managers and analysts in the
department's agencies, meaningful and diverse organizational changes throughout the
department, and a large resource investment both in the time of leaders and employees
throughout the department, including my office and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Administration and Management, and in consultants and technology that facilitated this
transformation.
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to them presented their agencies' performance and responded to my questions
in the quarterly review meetings. They valued their senior career managers'
competence in managing to achieve planned results. As a result, word spread
through the department that all of the agency heads and I were reviewing actual
performance against every measure. Front-line supervisors and employees
whose performance was being measured took notice, made their own
assessments of whether their performance would pass muster, and changed
their behavior accordingly.
But we did not rely on the Hawthorne effect alone. We employed five
additional accountability tools. The first tool was the most important: requiring
agencies to link all managers' individual performance standards to their
agency's performance under the agency's annual operating plan. Each SES
manager's individual performance plan expressly referenced the agency
operating plan, and specific performance results were incorporated into the SES
manager's performance review. For front-line supervisors, we began the
process of ensuring that the agency strategies and targets for which they were
responsible were incorporated into their individual performance plans. In this
way, we could be assured that managers and supervisors would take
performance data into account in the performance of their work.
The second tool was less important, but it is worth discussing because
it discloses my worst failure as the Labor Department's Chief Operating Office.
In its refined and successful form, this tool involved the Labor Department's
central performance staff providing each agency head with a ranking of its
performance as compared with the performance of the other agencies in the
Labor Department. In essence, agencies were ranked based on how many
targets they significantly exceeded, how many they met, and how many they
did not meet. These rankings were not published. Each agency head's report
showed only where his or her agency was ranked, but did not identify the
agencies that ranked higher and lower. The central performance staff, their
boss, my staff, the Secretary, and I were the only Labor Department employees
who knew how every agency ranked.
These extensive precautions were taken because, in 2011, we attempted
to use this ranking tool to help determine the performance ratings and bonuses
of each agency's SES managers. Simply, this tool was not mature enough to be
used for this purpose. As a result, the rankings, ratings, and bonuses were an
unmitigated disaster. Feelings were unnecessarily hurt. Doubts were raised
about our entire performance management enterprise. I had long promised that
performance management was not going to be used for punitive purposes, but
here I was using the system to label managers and take money out of their
pockets. It was a poor decision that was my fault. Fortunately, we recovered.
The third accountability tool was deployed within my last few months
as the Deputy Secretary: we liberated almost all of the performance data to
every employee in the Labor Department. While employees did not get to see
the extensive briefing memos I received every quarter from every agency, they
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were given access to a dashboard and portal to almost all of the data. They also
were given access to visualization tools to conduct their own analyses. Just
before I left, agencies began reporting not only nationwide results, but
performance results broken out by regional office. For example, OFCCP
divides the United States into five regions. Employees were able to see data
disclosing how each of these regions performed. So, OFCCP employees in one
region could compare their own performance against OFCCP employees in
other regions. But they could also compare their own performance against the
OSHA or Wage & Hour employees in their own region. Employees were
permitted to see data from all agencies, not merely their own. Ultimately, if a
successful performance management and measurement system is going to
survive, the employees, their unions, and front-line supervisors must own it.
Liberating our performance data was designed to facilitate that result.
The fourth accountability tool involved integrating performance data
and the departmental budget. We required that any agency submitting a request
for additional funding during the department's annual budget cycle specify,
with performance data and projections for future performance, how Congress
granting the request would improve performance. Predicting improvement
required the agency to have a full understanding of its successes and failures to
date, and a clear set of priorities. This proved to be a difficult requirement for
the agencies and the department's budget staff, if only for reasons of timing. In
the odd world of federal budgeting, agencies' budgets must be written more
than one year before the start of the fiscal year in which they would take effect.
For example, the Labor Department's portion of the President's Fiscal Year
(FY) 2016 budget, which would take effect on October 1, 2015, if enacted by
Congress, was originally submitted to OMB in August or September 2014, in
part so that the President's proposed budget could be issued in February
2015.103 While this timing may make sense for the President and OMB, it is
difficult to reconcile with the department's annual performance planning cycle.
Agencies that were finishing up implementation of their FY 2014 operating
plans and refining their FY 2015 operating plans in August or September 2015
were expected to predict how they would perform in FY 2016 with added
resources. This is a challenging thought exercise, but it required agencies'
leadership teams to think deeply about performance, performance planning,
prioritizing of activities and outcomes, and the real value of their existing
resources as well as any additional resources Congress might provide.
The fifth accountability tool involved the creation of an annual
performance index that sought to show the entirety of the Labor Department's

103

See Memorandum from Brian C. Deese, Deputy Director of the Office of Mgmt. and

Budget, to Heads of Departments and Agencies, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Guidance (May 5,
2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2014/m_1407.pdf.
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performance. 104 We sought to establish a yardstick for the department's overall
performance management system. We wanted it to disclose not merely whether
a particular agency or a particular function within an agency had improved, but
whether we had produced improved performance across the department. In a
sense, this was my report card as the Chief Operating Officer, and I used it as a
performance report to my superiors. I met with Secretary Solis in 2012 and
2013, and Secretary Tom Perez in 2014, to report on the previous year's
performance using the annual performance index. I instigated meetings with the
Deputy Director of OMB for Management and the OMB Labor Branch °5 and
its political boss each year for the same reason with the same tool in hand. As
discussed earlier, I attempted to meet with congressional staff to brief them on
the annual performance index, but to no avail. In the next section, I will explain
the standards used in the annual performance index to define and judge whether
the Labor Department and its leadership were successful in improving
performance.
B. The Results

There is no other enterprise in the American economy that performs all
of the same functions performed by the Labor Department. The department is
not like McDonald's which can compare, or "benchmark," its performance
against the performance of Burger King, Wendy's, and Arby's. The Labor
Department has no competitors and no comparators. As a result, we could only
benchmark the Labor Department's performance against its own past
performance to assess whether there had been improvement. In the process, we
were forced to answer the question that GPRA and the GPRAMA did not
answer: what is success in performance management?
We defined "success" by looking at the answers to two questions. The
first question was, for every measure, did this year's performance exceed
performance during all of the prior years for which we have data? In other
words, was this year's performance the best performance yet? We did not
literally mean "yet"; rather, we set a five-year horizon on our benchmarking to
ensure a fair comparison. The second question was, for every measure, did our
performance beat the average of the prior years' performance for that measure?
Again, we used a five-year horizon, so the agencies would average the past five
years of performance, or as many years of data as they had up to five years, and
compare the result to the present year's actual performance.
The following results from FY 2013, which is the last year for which
data were available at the time of this writing, demonstrate the success of the
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INDEX] (on file with author).
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This is the division of OMB that oversees the Labor Department's budget and policy
processes.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2015

39

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 117, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 7
1026

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 117

turnaround strategy. For all Labor Department performance measures for which
prior years' data were available, FY 2013 was the best year of performance on
57% of all measures. 106 That was an increase from FY 2011 and FY 2012. In
FY 2013, performance on three-quarters of all measures beat the averageagain, an increase from FY 2011 and FY 2012, where the numbers were
already high. 107 In sum, performance improved in a very large majority of the
Labor Department's functions and activities.
These broad-based improvements in performance were partly the
product of the rule for agency operating plans described above: every annual
target for every measure had to be set above the average of the agency's last
five years of performance. Agencies were required to plan and strive for our
definition of "success," they did, and they achieved success in the large
majority of their activities. But recall, also, that there was an exception: if an
agency's leadership team sought to deemphasize an activity, then it could set a
below-average target. To put the 75% above-average performance result in
perspective, and to show how truly broad-based performance improvements
were, in about half of the instances in which agencies failed to exceed the
average of their prior performance, it was the product of a conscious
management decision to deemphasize the activity and reduce actual
performance.'0 8 It was not poor performance. In other words, performance
improved when management wanted it to improve and declined when
management wanted it to decline for more than 85% of measures.
For one-quarter of the remaining 15% of measures, performance failed
to exceed the average of past performance within a variance of 5%. 109 In other
words, the agencies just barely missed succeeding by our standard. In another
small share of cases, surprises like unexpected increases in workload caused
performance in FY 2013 to fall below the average of prior years. 10 In sum,
genuinely problematic performance was the cause of below-average
performance for only 5% of measured activities."' By any measure, this is an
impressive result.
It is worth addressing several potential challenges to these broad-based
improvements in performance. The starting place should be budgets. Many of
the Labor Department's agencies, but not all, received increases in their FY
2010 appropriations, which was President Obama's first budget cycle. We
conducted extensive discussions within the department regarding when the
performance benefits of budget increases would and should be felt, but we
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never established a causal relationship or succeeded in quantifying or
pinpointing the timing of its effects. Nonetheless, budget increases can have
delayed effects that might have shown up in FY 2013. For example, many
agencies used their additional funds to hire more employees. In most cases,
these employees needed training and close supervision in their earliest days, so
I was told not to expect meaningful performance improvements during their
first year on the job. More training and more experience was expected to
increase their productivity over time, and the reduced demand for close
supervision should have freed more experienced staff to be more productive
over time. But we did not have real-time evidence of these effects or their
scope. They were hypotheses advanced by senior career managers based on
their experience that I found plausible.
Nonetheless, the excellent performance results in FY 2013 cannot be
entirely credited to additional budget resources received in FY 2010, and may
not be attributable to larger budgets at all. These performance improvements
were achieved in FY 2013, which was the fiscal year in which Congress
"sequestered" 5% of the funds from almost every federal agency's budget and
almost every budget program activity.' 12 In essence, almost every Labor
Department program activity had fewer resources in FY 2013 than in FY 2011
and FY 2012. Agencies were forced to cut back training, travel, overtime,
procurement of technology applications and hardware, and other productivity
enhancing activities. Performance should have suffered, and perhaps it did, but
it did not decline. It improved. Further, even the agencies that did not receive
meaningful budget increases in FY 2010 (e.g., OWCP and BLS), and one
agency that suffered a real cut in its FY 2010 budget (i.e., the Office of Labor
Management Standards) accomplished performance improvements in FY 2013
alongside their colleagues in agencies that received more resources. Money
alone does not explain the Labor Department's performance improvement. But
budgets cannot be entirely discounted when discussing performance. More
resources certainly make better performance easier, although they do not
guarantee it.
Challenges beyond budgets and their impacts should also be addressed.
Skeptics reading the Labor Department's FY 2013 performance results might
ask whether the leadership team, led by its Chief Operating Officer, somehow
"juiced" the numbers to make overall performance look better than it actually
was. For example, did we add a sizable number of new performance measures
to our operating plans where we knew performance would inevitably improve?
The following data should prove that the answer is "no." ' 3 We tracked the
results for all of the performance measures that had been instituted before
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2009-that is, before the Obama-appointed Labor Department leadership team
took over. In FY 2013, the department had its best year of performance yet on
58% of those measures, or roughly the same results as for all Labor Department
measures. 11 4 Performance on 80% of these measures beat the average of our
past performance in FY 2013, or slightly better than the department's
performance on all of its measures. 1 5 Again, these were improvements over FY
2011 and FY 2012. In sum, there is no support for the argument that the
department cheated with respect to the kinds and quality of performance
measures instituted. To the contrary, the new measures we instituted were a
sincere effort to account for and improve performance.
Another reasonable challenge to the department's excellent
performance results would be to ask whether the leadership team or the
agencies overloaded the department's portfolio of performance measures with
unimportant process or administrative measures to produce a more impressive
aggregate result.' 6 We tracked the department's performance on its outcome
measures-that is, the very important measures that assess real-world impacts
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LABOR PERFORMANCE INDEX, supra note 104, at 7.
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16 I reject any diminution in the importance of measuring administrative functions like human
resources, financial management, information technology management, and procurement
services. These functions are often defined as "business services" that are outside the core
mission and core competencies of government entities. This is a crimped view of these functions.
They are essential to the success of the other functions that may be more easily defined as
serving an agency's mission.
For example, early in my tenure as Deputy Secretary, for a variety of reasons, the
department's financial managers were having difficulty paying the department's bills on time.
Under the Prompt Pay Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3907 (2012), agencies that do not pay a bill
within a fixed time frame must pay a specified interest penalty. Late payments, at one point, cost
the department more than $1 million in interest penalties. We introduced a performance measure
that tracked whether bills were paid on time. Accrued penalties declined dramatically and
ultimately fell below the federal government's standard. Most important, the money saved was
available for investment in additional personnel, improved information technology, or other
productivity-enhancing expenditures.
Similarly, the speed with which we hired new employees is an important measure, and a
measure employed across the federal government. Every vacant position reduces productivity in
any agency that depends, like virtually all Labor Department agencies, on labor-intensive efforts
for their success. Assessing the quality of hires, or at least hiring managers' satisfaction with new
employees, was another important measure. Quickly hiring unqualified people is not a path to
improved performance. In the same vein, the speed and accuracy with which the department's
information technology "help desk" responded to employees' inquiries is an important
contributor to productivity given the ubiquity of technology in modem work life.
It is important to add emphatically that not all administrative measures are important or
should survive in a mission-focused performance management system. For example, no one cares
or should care how many paper clips an employment law enforcement agency buys. But these
kinds of discussions about which measures are meaningful and meaningless was a critical part of
the Labor Department's turnaround effort.
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on workers and the department's other customers. 11 7 In 2013, performance on
72% of the department's outcome measures was the best yet." 8 Performance on
89% of outcome measures beat the average of past performance. 119 Again, FY
2013 was better than FY 2011 and FY 2012.
There is an important caveat that should be added to these impressive
results on outcome measures. Some sizable portion of the Labor Department's
outcome measures are associated with ETA's job training programs, their
success in placing workers into jobs, and whether those workers are retained in
their jobs. Of course, the United States suffered a catastrophic finance-sectorled economic downturn beginning in 2007 with a jobs recession that continued
long thereafter. After reaching its peak at around 10% in late 2009,120 the
unemployment rate began to improve, Americans slowly returned to work, and
employers began haltingly to hire again in 2011, 2012, and 2013.121 This
improvement in the labor market was an exogenous factor that almost certainly
effected some unknown increase in ETA's "entered employment rate" (i.e.,
success in placing workers exiting job training programs into unsubsidized
jobs) and its "retained employment rate" (i.e., success of these workers in
keeping their
jobs for several quarters) in all of the many job training programs
22
it funds.

While this fact does not minimize the improvement in the outcomes
experienced by the customers of ETA-funded job training programs, it makes
crediting ETA with the improvements more difficult. As a result, the stunning
improvements in outcomes measures seen in FY 2013 may be somewhat less
amazing. But not all outcome measures belonged to ETA and its job training
programs. Some related to workplace fatalities and injuries overseen by MSHA
and OSHA. Other agencies also contributed outcome measures. So, this caveat
does not undermine the conclusion that departmental performance on outcome
measures improved significantly, although perhaps not as much as these gaudy
numbers might suggest.
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Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR: BUREAU OF LAB.
http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
Id.; see also Lucia Mutikani, Recession Fears Ease on Factory, Hiring Data, REUTERS

(Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/31/us-usa-economy-idUSTRE77U25D
20110831.
122
These are two of four so-called "WIA common measures" required by the Workforce
Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220 § 136(b)(2), 112 Stat. 936, 999, and its successor,
the Workforce Investment Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 113-128, § 116(b)(2), 128 Stat. 1425
(2014). The third and fourth measures are average (or median) earnings in unsubsidized
employment and attainment of industry-recognized credentials.
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In fact, a look at some of the Labor Department's outcomes in FY 2013
shows the importance of this turnaround strategy to the lives of working
families. In FY 2013, the department achieved the lowest fatality rate for
miners in the United States, ever. 123 The number of miners who died in
workplace accidents also was the lowest, ever. The number of workplace
injuries in mines was the lowest, ever. The department achieved the lowest rate
of fatalities in general industry, ever. 124 Over the five years ending in FY 2013,
the delartment achieved the lowest fatality rate in the construction industry,
ever.
In FY 2013, the department conducted the largest number of
whistleblower investigations, ever. 126 In FY 2013 alone, the department
responded to more complaints from miners suffering retaliation for raising
health and safety concerns than were responded to in the entire second term of
the Bush Administration or the entire second term of the Clinton
Administration. Over the first five years of the Obama Administration, the
Labor Department returned more than $1.1 billion dollars in wages lost through
wage theft to the workers who earned them. The department also did the best
job, ever, of targeting Wage & Hour investigations to the workplaces that had
violations.
In FY 2013, the department conducted the largest number of pension
and health plan civil investigations and criminal investigations, ever. Over
the five years ending in FY 2013, the department recovered more than $1.3
billion in pension and health plan benefits for more than 710,000 participants
and beneficiaries. In FY 2013, the department assured that the largest
percentage, ever, of workers exiting Labor Department job training programs
got industry-recognized credentials that would increase their likelihood of
finding and keeping jobs.
In FY 2013, the department did the best job, ever, of finding the very
small number of union officers and staff who embezzled funds or engaged in
fraud. The department also concluded investigations of union elections faster
than ever before with the fewest resources available in more than a decade. The
department helped the largest percentage of federal employees who acquired
disabilities and collected workers compensation to return to work, ever. The
department also processed workers compensation claims for longshore
workers, federal employees, and energy employees at the fastest clip, ever.
The department accomplished these outcomes, and many others, while
securing clean financial audits for five consecutive years and successfully
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implementing two large-scale information technology procurements. In FY
2013, the department did the best job, ever, of paying its bills on time, and paid
its small business contractors faster than ever before. The percentage of the
Labor Department's contracts that were entered into with small businesses also
was the highest, ever.
There was no conflict between achieving these progressive outcomes
and significantly reforming employment law through regulations and other
processes. While accomplishing this broad-based performance improvement,
the department expanded minimum wage and overtime protections to nearly
two million home health aides. 128 The department strengthened affirmative
action for people with disabilities and veterans. 129 It significantly strengthened
its regulations protecting miners from black lung'13 and proposed a new
regulation to protect workers from exposure to respirable silica. 13 ' The
department also promulgated almost two dozen rules in cooperation with the
Treasury and Health and Human Services Departments implementing the
President's Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 13 2 This is only a small
sampling of the department's regulatory output during the first five years of the
Obama Administration. And it does not include the department's involvement
in the President's legislative, trade, and foreign policy agendas.
Of course, these accomplishments did not occur in a vacuum. They
were achieved despite a very difficult environment for the federal government
and federal employees, as well as the people and organizations served by the
Labor Department. The department achieved these results while responding to
the worst financial crisis in seven decades, 33 the largest economic stimulus

128

See Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 29 C.F.R. § 552

(2013).
129 See Affirmative

Action

and Nondiscrimination

Obligations

of Contractors and

Subcontractors Regarding Individuals with Disabilities, 78 Fed. Reg. 58681 (Sept. 24, 2013) (to
be codified at 41 C.F.R. § 60-741); Affirmative Action and Nondiscrimination Obligations of
Contractors and Subcontractors Regarding Special Disabled Veterans, Veterans of the Vietnam
Era, Disabled Veterans, Recently Separated Veterans, Active Duty Wartime or Campaign Badge
Veterans, and Armed Forces Service Medal Veterans, 78 Fed. Reg. 58613 (Sept. 24, 2013) (to be
codified at 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-250, 60-300).
130 See Lowering Miners' Exposure to Respirable Coal Mine Dust, Including Continuous
Personal Dust Monitors, 79 Fed. Reg. 24813 (May 1, 2014).
131 Occupational Exposure to Respirable Crystalline Silica, 78 Fed. Reg. 177 (proposed Sept.
12, 2013).
132 See Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/healthreform/ (last
visited Feb. 27, 2015) (listing regulations and guidance).
133

See Recession Took Bigger Bite Than Estimated, BLOOMBERGBUS1NESS (July 29, 2011),

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-29/recession-took-bigger-bite-out-of-u-s-economythan-previously-estimated.html.
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legislation ever, 13 4 the worst oil spill ever, 135 the worst mine disaster in four
decades, 136 two shut downs of the federal government and several threatened
38
shut downs, 137 at least two potential defaults on the U.S. government's debts,'
sequestration of the funds necessary to the accomplishment of40the department's
' and a three-year pay freeze for federal employees. 1
mission, 39
Outcome measures are not the only way of assessing the department's
success in achieving its mission. Another method is to consider performance on
the department's key performance indicators-the outcomes and outputs
promised in the department's revamped strategic plan-including many of
those discussed in the preceding paragraphs. The department's analysis showed
that performance on those strategic plan measures in FY 2013 was essentially
the same as performance on all Labor Department measures. The department
had its best performance yet on 53% of strategic plan measures. 141 Performance
on 71% of strategic plan measures beat the average of past performance. 142 So,
the strategic plan indicators appear to be representative of departmental
performance overall. They also demonstrate that the department performed well
in the activities that the leadership team considered to be most important to the
accomplishment of the Labor Department's mission.
The bottom line of all of these data analyses is that the department, by
almost any reasonable measure, did not merely beat its past performance in FY
134 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009).
135
Campbell Robertson & Clifford Kraus, BP May Be Fined up to $18 Billion for Spill in
Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2014, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/

business/bp-negligent-in-2010-oil-spill-us-judge-rules.html.
136 See supra Part II.B.2.iii.
137

See Carl Hulse, Budget Deal To Cut $38 Billion Averts Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,

2011, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/09/us/politics/09fiscal.html; Jonathan
Weisman & Jeremy W. Peters, U.S. Government Is Shutting Down in Fiscal Impasse, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 1, 2013, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/l0/01/us/politics/
congress-shutdown-debate.html; Ashley Parker & Jeremy W. Peters, House Republicans Ready
Plan To Avoid a Government Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2014, at A18, available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/us/house-gop-weighs-symbolic-immigration-vote-in-planto-avoid-shutdown.html.
138 See Jackie Calmes & Carl Hulse, Debt Ceiling Talks Collapse as Boehner Walks Out, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/us/politics/23fiscal.html; Ashley
Parker & Annie Lowrey, Boehner Pledges To Avoid Default, Republicans Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
4,

2013,

at

Al,

available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/us/politics/debt-limit-

impasse.html.
1' See GAO-14-244, supra note 112.
140 Josh Hicks, Bill Would Increase FederalPay by 3.3 PercentNext Year, WASH. POST (Mar.
26,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/03/26/bill-wouldincrease-federal-pay-by-3-3-percent-next-year/.
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2013, and FY 2012, and FY 2011. The department got better at continuous
improvement every year, with FY 2013 performance achieving the highest
level in recent memory, and perhaps ever. Even more important, the workers
and others who are served by the Labor Department experienced these
improvements in their lives and were better off because the department
improved its performance.
There is one more challenge to these conclusions that raises doubts
about the basic premise that better performance was the result of improved
management. It is fair to ask, was all of this mere happenstance? Do we know
that Labor Department managers and supervisors actually used performance
data to manage performance in 2013 and produce these dramatic and broadbased performance improvements? Can these results be attributed to evidencebased, data-driven management practices? Fortunately, the GAO survey,
discussed in the first section of this Article, answers these questions.
In 2012, GAO surveyed managers in all of the departments that make
1 43
up the President's Cabinet and ten other large executive branch agencies.
Three-quarters of managers answered the survey as part of a stratified sample.
GAO asked these managers several dozen questions about whether their
agencies used evidence-based, data-driven decision-making throughout the
department. Did their supervisors use it? Did their employees use it? Did they
use it? Were they held accountable for using it? Was every imaginable kind of
measure used? 144 The executive branch managers answering the survey were
given a spectrum of choices ranging from (paraphrased) "No, we didn't use that
type of evidence and data-driven
45 management at all" to "we used it to a very
great extent"--the top rating.
The Labor Department's Office of the Chief Evaluation Officer
analyzed the results of the survey and found that the Labor Department
received the top rating-that is, its managers said it used specific evidencebased, data-driven practices "to a very great extent"--more than any other
executive branch agency. 146 The analysis also found that the Labor Department
placed fourth out of twenty-four executive branch agencies, and ahead of all
other Cabinet departments, with respect to the percentage of managers giving
the top two ratings. 147 In September 2014, GAO issued its analysis of the

143

See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-518, MANAGING FOR RESULTS:

EXECUTIVE BRANCH SHOULD MORE FULLY IMPLEMENT THE GPRA MODERNIZATION ACT To
ADDRESS PRESSING GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES (2013).
144 See Managingfor Results: 2013 FederalManagers Survey on OrganizationalPerformance

and Management Issues, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (2013), available at
http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/gao- 13-519sp/index.htm.
145 Id.
146 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM THE GAO
FEDERAL MANAGER SURVEY 7 (2013) (on file with the author).
147

Id. at 9.
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survey results showing that the Labor Department was one of only two
agencies with a statistically significant improvement in its average score from
2007 to 2012. 148 GAO also found that the Labor Department's average score on
all questions was the third highest in the executive branch and the highest
among all Cabinet departments. 149 This is powerful circumstantial evidence that
the department's dramatic and broad-based improvement in performance was
the result of a commitment to using performance data and analysis to manage
and make decisions.
The next section offers a reform agenda that would increase the
likelihood that these kinds of performance improvements will occur across the
federal executive branch, including in its labor-related agencies.
Iv. A PROGRAM FOR REFORM
The Labor Department's turnaround strategy succeeded in producing
good, improving performance across functions and agencies. This is not to
suggest that the department's improvement process was complete when I left in
January 2014. I often joked with my colleagues just prior to my departure that
we had completed only the fourth year of a ten-year process. There is a great
deal more the Labor Department could accomplish to improve its performance
with more sophisticated data analysis and predictive analytics, real-time display
of performance data to Labor Department managers and employees along with
other transparency measures, and the transformation of program evaluation
results into performance data. One critical innovation implemented by
Secretary Tom Perez and my successor Deputy Secretary Chris Lu was to
review, including directly with front-line employees, how agencies'
performance measures and the expectations that attend them are being
communicated to front-line supervisors and by front-line supervisors to frontline employees.
Nonetheless, one reason the department achieved the performance
improvements detailed in the preceding section is that the department's
leadership team solved the problems left unsolved in GPRA and the GPRAMA.
But those flaws remain. The success of a government performance system
should not depend upon agency leadership teams working around the laws
defining that system. These systems are fragile. Continuity, particularly in the
collection of data, is critical. An election or an intraparty change in personnel
can overturn the entire enterprise and result in a return to superficial GPRA
compliance without the substance of good-quality performance. After taking
office, Secretary Perez and Deputy Secretary Lu gave their inherited leadership

U.S GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-747, MANAGING FOR RESULTS: AGENCIES'
TRENDS INTHE USE OF PERFORMANCE INFORMATION TO MAKE DECISIONS 9 (2014), available at
148

www.gao.gov/assets/670/666187.pdf.
149 Id. at 17-18.
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team an opportunity to discontinue or dramatically scale back the Labor
Department's performance management and measurement system. The
Assistant Secretaries and other agency leaders, after four years of experience
with the system and its successes, chose to keep the system in place with only
minor modifications.
One superficially appealing solution short of law reform would be for
presidents to appoint only skilled, well-trained professional managers with
experience overseeing performance management systems to lead every
executive branch agency. This Article should offer testimony that this solution
is not needed. As noted above, the members of the Obama Labor Department's
leadership team could not have been fairly described as experienced, formallytrained performance managers. Yet, they achieved dramatic performance
improvements under very difficult circumstances in a complex organization.
Further, the costs of trading policy expertise for management experience are
difficult to calculate, but potentially threatening to a president's agenda. A
more nuanced mix of senior, presidentially appointed personnel along with a
performance management training program should be part of the next
president's agenda. There is a critical role for both policy and management at
the highest levels of the federal executive branch. The task is to maximize the
results from both functions.
But the surest solution would come from improved systems. At a
minimum, Congress should fix identifiable problems in GPRA and the
GPRAMA. The greater challenge is to institutionalize high-quality government
performance and systems that ensure continuous improvement across the
United States government. This section will offer a reform agenda that has as
its goal ensuring effective performance management and measurement
throughout the federal executive branch without unnecessarily disrupting
existing systems that may be entirely effective and essential to improved
performance. Congress must make reforms, and the first section below
elaborates on those reforms. But the following section will also suggest efforts
that should be undertaken by stakeholder organizations that are the voice of
government's customers and constituents. Since the principal problem with
GPRA and the GPRAMA is that Congress failed to establish effective
mechanisms for overseeing executive branch performance, one important
remedy is to hold Congress accountable and establish a thoroughgoing system
of citizen oversight of government performance.
A. Congress
Most of the reforms that Congress should undertake have been
previewed in earlier sections of this Article, particularly in the discussion of the
GPRAMA's failure to address problems with GPRA. In this section, I will
make these reforms explicit and expand upon them.
The first and most important problem to be solved is the lack of a
system whereby Congress holds the executive branch accountable for
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GPRA/GPRAMA compliance and, more importantly, improving performance.
In essence, GPRA and the GPRAMA amounted to drive-by legislating.
Congress passed the laws, but then walked away without taking the necessary
steps to ensure they were implemented properly. The solution is simple:
Congress must establish oversight systems and hold itself accountable for
operating those systems successfully.
The House of Representatives and the Senate should change their rules
to require that every authorizing committee and every appropriations subcommittee hold an annual hearing in which they review the GPRA compliance
and performance of the agencies within their jurisdictions. Where there are
overlapping jurisdictions, the Senate Majority Leader and the Speaker of the
House should make assignments. HSGAC and COGR should remain
responsible for oversight of the process and GPRA and the GPRAMA
generally, and they should keep their jurisdiction over OMB's role in the
GPRA compliance process. Yet, these committees should not be involved in
the substance of performance management and measurement for agencies over
which they do not have jurisdiction.
Congressional committees are thinly staffed and not necessarily
prepared to take on this sizable new performance oversight role. They will need
help. Congress should direct GAO or the agencies' inspectors general to audit
each agency's performance in advance of the authorizing committees' and
appropriations sub-committees' hearings. GAO's and the inspectors general's
roles should be strictly limited to comparing actual performance to goals set in
agency operating/performance plans, investigating the integrity of performance
data used by the agencies, and assessing compliance with GPRA and the
GPRAMA. Policy and strategic judgments should be left to a debate between
Congress and agencies' leadership teams. Of course, both Congress's hearings
and all audits should be accessible to the public.
Annual hearings and individual agency audits alone will not provide a
full measure of the quality of an agency's performance. Federal agencies
should be benchmarked against one another. Just as there is no entity in the
American economy that performs all of the same functions as the Labor
Department, there are no competitors or comparators for the U.S. Departments
of Defense, Interior, State, Transportation, or Agriculture, or any other Cabinet
department or executive branch department. There are only two possible
benchmarks for these organizations: their own past performance and the
performance of other large federal agencies. Congress should use both
benchmarks as a means of putting each agency's annual performance results in
context.
Congress should direct every agency to construct an annual
performance index that offers a complete picture of the agency's actual
performance compared with its past performance. Congress should also direct
GAO and OMB to develop a system for ranking agencies' performance on the
basis of these annual performance indices. Plainly, it is not possible to compare
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the Labor Department's success in training workers with the Defense
Department's success in defeating terrorism threats in foreign countries. This is
the classic "apples-to-oranges" comparison. But the purpose of the rankings is
not to offer this kind of comparison. Effective benchmarking depends upon an
"apples-to-apples" comparison. The goal should be to compare each agency's
success in sustaining or surpassing its own performance with every other
agency's success on the same measure.
The closely related second problem is that GPRA and the GPRAMA
do not define "success." Worse, they implicitly define "failure" to be actual
performance that does not meet an agency's target for performance. As noted
above, meeting or exceeding targets is a poor measure of successful
performance. Congress should abandon targets as the measure of success or
failure. In place of targets, Congress should shift its focus to past performance
as agencies' principal benchmark. Agencies should be required, in some form,
to compare their actual performance in the present year to performance in prior
years.
Although we did not encounter such a circumstance in the Labor
Department during President Obama's first five years, it is possible that this
approach is not appropriate or optimal for every activity in every agency.
Accordingly, agencies should be permitted to propose some substitute measure
that discloses performance trends. For example, some agencies may have wellfunctioning cost-accounting systems. These kinds of systems can be valid
alternatives. But the default should be a standard that an agency's actual
performance in the present year is equal to or better than some measure of
performance in prior years (e.g., the Labor Department's system of averaging a
fixed number of prior years' data). Exceptions should be permitted for those
activities where performance has been deemphasized, real (i.e., inflationadjusted) budgets have been reduced, or some other legitimate excuse is
articulated by the agency's leadership in the annual performance plan. The
validity of these excuses can be debated in the committees' and subcommittees' oversight hearings. But the debate over which agency has been
most successful would be facilitated by the ranking system to be developed by
OMB and GAO.
Similarly, Congress must abandon its stated focus on, but actual
indifference to, "priority goals." Instead, Congress and OMB should turn their
attention to all of the goals articulated in an agency's strategic plan. Plainly,
trying to assess performance using all of the metrics included in an agency's
operating plan, or the operating plans of a federated department's (like the
Labor Department) many constituent agencies, would be overwhelming for
Congress and its committees. But the strategic plan measures should be an
agency's key performance indicators. If constructed properly, they should
reflect overall agency performance and emphasize the highest priority activities
and outcomes. The existing priority goals offer only a very small subset of this
larger, more comprehensive, but still manageable universe. Congress should be
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concerned with the most important, best, and most comprehensive measures of
whether an agency is carrying out its mission. Further, while the strategic plan
measures should be reported as one important category of information for
observers' consideration, the committees and sub-committees conducting
oversight hearings should be free to inquire into any measure in any agency's
performance plan. Agencies' choices regarding which measures are included in
the strategic plan should not be a means of obfuscating performance in
problematic areas. The result would be a strong incentive to strip selected,
potentially important outcome goals out of agencies' strategic plans.
The third problem is that the GPRA/GPRAMA system offers no
assurance that the data it generates are actually employed in agencies'
management decision-making. I have already described the GAO survey of
executive branch managers that broadly tests this question. Congress must
require and fund GAO to conduct this survey and analyze its results every year
rather than every five years. GAO's analysis of the survey's results should be
expanded beyond average scores and distributed much more widely.
To further ensure that federal managers use performance data in their
everyday decision-making, Congress also must amend the statute establishing
the individual performance review system. While it should be permissible for
agency leaders to take other factors like equal employment opportunity and
efforts to increase workforce diversity into account in these managers' reviews,
agency and individual performance outcomes and outputs must be preeminent.
Binding managers' individual performance reviews-and their opportunities
for promotion and bonuses, along with their risks of discipline-to agency
performance will incentivize close attention to performance data and efforts to
improve performance. Accordingly, Congress should amend the law to make
unmistakably clear that the principal factors in review and bonus
determinations are the success of the SES manager's agency in improving
performance, the SES manager's contributions to improving performance and
accomplishing her agency's performance goals and, most importantly,
performance results for activities that are within the manager's scope of
responsibility.
The fourth problem with GPRA and the GPRAMA is that connections
between agencies' strategies, outputs, and outcomes are not always selfevident, and may be quite difficult for observers to understand. Congress
should require agencies to include plain-English statements in their strategic
plans regarding how their strategies and outputs produce the outcomes
articulated in their strategic plans-that is, their hypotheses of the causal
connections between outputs and outcomes. Congress should also require and
fund program evaluations in any circumstance where an agency does not or
cannot report on outcomes as part of its performance measurement system.
Additional funding is critical, and should be a precondition for the imposition
of any such requirement. While evaluations of specific strategies or procedures
within a program might be conducted at fairly low cost using administrative
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data, a properly conducted evaluation of a program as a whole can cost millions
of dollars. Appropriations necessary to carrying out an agency's mission must
not be re-directed to program evaluation simply because Congress is unwilling
to make the requisite investment in studying how government best serves its
customers and constituents. Degrading performance to measure performance is
not good government.
In some cases, including the ETA and MSHA examples offered above,
agencies' performance data include outcome reporting. Nothing further should
be required to evaluate the program as a whole when this is true, although it is
important to continue to evaluate strategies and components of programs to, for
example, test how to improve outcomes. But in other circumstances, like
OFCCP's program outcome quandary also discussed above, further study is
required. In the simplest terms possible, Americans want to know that
government is delivering results that improve their lives, their society, their
communities, and their country. Agencies should be required to study and
explain how every program they manage is doing exactly that, with the possible
exception of administrative functions that support mission-focused activities.
Agencies should also explain how they intend to transform program evaluation
information into performance data over time.
The fifth problem is that Congress's mandate regarding when and for
which activities performance plans are required is confusing, at best, and
ineffective, at worst. Too many agency activities slip through this porous
requirement. In the case of the Labor Department before 2009, a large
percentage of constituent agencies were able to escape the requirement to
create and implement operating/performance plans. Congress should require
that every department, agency, and operating unit of the executive branch
produce an operating plan that measures performance with respect to every
activity or function that is relevant to carrying out that entity's mission. A
"relevance" standard would likely lead agencies to include every activity and
function in its operating plan out of fear that any implicit admission of a
program's "irrelevance" could lead Congress to eliminate its funding. An
alternative and more forgiving standard would be to require operating plans
that cover every activity or function that is "important" to carrying out that
entity's mission and how those parts of the program can be improved. 50 This
lower standard increases the risk that agencies will not measure performance in
certain functions; however, this is precisely the kind of issue that the GAO or
inspector audits and congressional hearings could address.
It would be fair to criticize this focus on Congress as both unrealistic
and potentially perilous to the independence of the executive branch. Congress
has struggled to carry out its own fundamental constitutional duty to enact

150 It might make sense to leave a safety valve by allowing agency heads, at their discretion, to

exempt operating units that exclusively provide supportive services like congressional and public
affairs.
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annual appropriations bills for the past several years. 15' Expecting Congress to
oversee executive branch performance effectively when its own performance
has been fodder for late-night television hosts' monologues and single-digit
approval ratings in public polls may be too ambitious. But Congress is the only
means of achieving the entirety of this reform agenda. The next president could
direct his or her appointees in OMB and the executive branch agencies to
implement pieces of the agenda, including defining "success," creating annual
performance indices, explaining relationships between outputs and outcomes,
articulating comprehensive program evaluation agendas, and requiring
operating plans from every operating unit, for example. Other large and
important pieces of the agenda, particularly those that would facilitate serious
debate about the functioning of government, can only be accomplished through
Congress. Like it or not, Congress must participate.
B. Stakeholders
Almost every report required by GPRA, the GPRAMA, and the
reforms I have advocated must be made public. Every strategic plan, most
aspects of agencies' operating/performance plans, every program evaluation,
every quarterly and annual performance measure, and actual performance from
every quarter and year must be published on agencies' web sites. Every annual
performance index, the GAO survey and its analysis and results, every GAO
and Inspector General audit, and every ranking of the agencies' performance
and commitment to evidence-based, data-driven decision-making should be
collected and published on a central OMB web site. Every congressional
hearing on government performance must be open to the public.
Only one aspect of agencies' annual operating/performance plans
arguably should not be published. Certain strategic choices to be made by law
enforcement agencies, including the Labor Department's employment law
enforcement agencies, should be kept confidential as a means of avoiding
advance notice to likely targets of enforcement activity. The police typically do
not broadcast advance notice of targets for raids or sweeps because doing so
would likely result in the targeted criminal activity being hidden or moved. The
same is true for OSHA, Wage & Hour, MSHA, OFCCP, and the Labor
Department's other law enforcement agencies, as well as the Department of
Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Secret
Service, the Justice Department's Federal Bureau of Investigation and Drug
Enforcement Agency, and other law enforcement entities in the federal
executive branch. Of course, the same concern arises with respect to national
security agencies like the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Coast Guard. Agencies should
be empowered to redact sections of their operating/performance plans that

151 See supra notes 137-38.
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would disclose law enforcement, national security, or intelligence gathering
plans if, and only if, disclosure would risk the accomplishment of the agencies'
missions. Of course, these redacted sections should be subject to in camera
review by congressional authorizing and appropriating committees and their
sub-committees. With this limited exception, agencies' operating/performance
plans should be made public every year.
The purpose of public disclosure is to empower non-governmental
actors to hold both Congress and the executive branch agencies accountable.
This is not to suggest that Congress will never play its appropriate oversight
role. Whether or not Congress takes responsibility for overseeing
GPRA/GPRAMA compliance and executive branch performance, stakeholders
must be actively engaged, although the need for stakeholder engagement is
greater if Congress continues to abdicate its role. But stakeholder engagement
will keep all of the players honest: Congress, OMB, and the executive branch
agencies. Also, stakeholder engagement often leads to congressional
engagement as members of Congress learn that involvement in an issue may
win the favor of their constituents or other important interests. So, a virtuous
cycle may result.
Some might argue that public disclosure alone will cause the agencies
to perform better and pay closer attention to their performance and operating
planning. But this argument is premised on the expectation that someone is
watching. The shame of public embarrassment and the implicit threat that an
outsider's review of disclosed information will lead to consequences together
cause public disclosure to change behavior. But is anyone watching? Earlier, I
used the phrase "the public" to describe one of the overseers of executive
branch performance. 152 Of course, 300+ million Americans are not going to
review the mountains of plans and data that agencies are required to produce by
GPRA and the GPRAMA, much less those I would have Congress require.
"The public" is not watching. Americans are simply too busy working, caring
for their families, attending to their health and the health of friends and family,
serving and otherwise participating in their communities, and planning their
futures.
Instead, "the public" depends upon its elected representatives to carry
out this function. They also depend upon stakeholders as a proxy army focusing
on different aspects of the public interest and holding elected and appointed
officials accountable. Unionized and many other workers rely on the AFL-CIO
and its affiliates, the Service Employees International Union, and other
independent unions and worker organizations. Environmentally conscious
voters rely on the League of Conservation Voters, the Sierra Club, the Natural
Resources Defense Council, and other environmental organizations. Civil
libertarians look to the American Civil Liberties Union and civil rights
advocates depend upon the NAACP, the Leadership Conference on Civil
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Rights, the National Council of La Raza, the Human Rights Campaign, and
other civil rights and advocacy groups. Small businesses rely on the National
Federation of Independent Business and other business lobbying groups,
including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. A very long list of trade
associations advocate for various domestic and foreign industries and
occupations.
The critical opportunity in reforming and improving federal
government performance is the engagement of well-informed stakeholders
using accessible tools provided to them by the government to hold both
Congress and the executive branch accountable. The tasks in which these
stakeholder overseers should engage are easily enumerated. First, they should
lobby Congress to enact the legislative and organizational reforms explained in
this section. Second, they should review drafts of agencies' strategic plans so
that they can engage actively with the agencies and Congress regarding the
definition of agencies' missions and which outcomes and key performance
indicators would demonstrate that the agency is carrying out its mission.
Stakeholders should insist on extensive and public opportunities to meet with
top agency leaders and performance staff during the strategic plan formulation
process to discuss these topics. In an ideal world, these sessions would be livestreamed on agencies' web sites so that stakeholder groups' members, and
stakeholder organizations unable to afford a trip to Washington, D.C., can
participate remotely. At a minimum, and akin to the notice and comment
process in the Administrative Procedure Act, 53 agencies should publish a
summary of all such discussions with stakeholders along with any written
comments submitted by stakeholder groups. Of course, stakeholder groups
should submit detailed written comments, but they should also educate their
members about the content of the strategic plans and their importance.
These discussions regarding agencies' strategic plans should include a
deep exploration of the agencies' program evaluation plans. In my experience,
discussions between agency officials and stakeholders about which strategies
they should pursue are heavily infused with unproven, often ideologically
driven assumptions about causal connections between outputs and outcomes.
Agency leaders should be able to explain to stakeholders in clear terms how
they intend to demonstrate that their activities and strategies will improve the
lives of the stakeholder group's constituents and others who are similarly
situated. Stakeholders should insist that assumptions about connections
between outputs and outcomes are made explicit and evidence to support them
either disclosed or developed in the agency's strategic plan. It is essential to
remember that, under the GPRAMA, agency strategic plans will remain in
place through an entire presidential term. So, these stakeholder interactions
with agencies about program evaluation, outcomes, and mission are very high
stakes. They should be given a high priority by stakeholder organizations.
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Third, stakeholders should engage aggressively with agencies every
year as they develop their annual operating/performance plans. These plans will
determine how agencies invest their resources on a day-to-day basis, so
stakeholder organizations should insist on an opportunity to review draft plans
and challenge agency leaders' strategic choices and target-setting decisions.
The mere demand that agencies publicly release their operating plans will
increase the likelihood that they will create such plans for all of their operating
units. Nonetheless, this demand is going to be met with a great deal of
resistance from agency officials conditioned to withhold this kind of
information from the public as a means of guarding against public criticism and
judgment. Stakeholders must insist.
The value of non-governmental actors' engagement in this context
cannot be overstated. Outsiders are going to be hostile to arguments that are too
common and too commonly accepted in the federal government: "because
we've always done (or measured) it that way," "because this function requires
staff who are rated a GS-12 and my staff members are all rated GS-13," and
"because Congressman Smith is going to be upset if we close our office in
Omaha to staff that priority initiative in Los Angeles." Breaking out of internal
logic systems that rationalize inadequate performance and hamstring agency
leaders will be one important product of stakeholder engagement. Stakeholders
will not quietly acquiesce in inertia and business-as-usual if their constituents'
interests are at stake.
Again, stakeholders should insist on meeting with agency leaders and
demand an opportunity to provide them with detailed written comments on
their draft operating plans. Agency leaders should be required to explain the
choices and resource investments included in their operating plans.
Stakeholders should demand plain-English explanations of how agency leaders
are going to ensure that their activities and strategies improve the lives of the
stakeholders' constituents and others. Perhaps most important, the operating
plans released to the public must contain quarterly and annual targets for every
important activity in an agency. Stakeholders must have this information if they
are going to hold agencies accountable for their performance in real time.
Fourth, stakeholders should demand public release of all quarterly and
annual performance data. Along with public release of operating/performance
plans, this is a necessary mechanism to allow stakeholders to compare actual
performance with the targets in the agency's operating/performance plan. But
stakeholders must not be passive recipients of agency data dumps. Stakeholders
should offer their judgments about how agencies are performing using these
data and, if Congress or the President requires them, the agencies' annual
performance indices. If neither Congress nor the GAO rank agencies'
performance, then stakeholder groups should. If agencies do not produce
annual performance indices, then stakeholders must. But stakeholder groups
should not merely re-hash or disclose the numbers. They should offer detailed
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critiques of agency performance that they publish and share with Congress to
inform any congressional hearings that may be held.
Annual performance indices would provide insight into agency-wide
performance, but they would not look at cross-agency functional areas despite
the GPRAMA's requirement of the creation of a few cross-agency priority
goals. This is another role stakeholder groups can fill. For example, the Labor
Department's OFCCP, the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission share responsibility for the
enforcement of anti-discrimination laws that protect workers. 154 Reviewing the
Labor Department's annual performance index alone, or even side-by-side with
the Justice Department and EEOC indices, would not give observers a clear
picture of the government's performance on workplace civil rights. However,
civil rights stakeholder groups might construct a "civil rights performance
index" that looks at and compares performance measures drawn from all three
agencies to assess how the incumbent administration is performing on the
issues of greatest interest to those groups' constituents. Similar cross-agency
indices would be valuable in many areas of federal government responsibility
ranging from environmental protection to health care to worker training to
immigration to consumer protection to national security.
Stakeholder organizations could organize themselves to accomplish all
of these tasks and contribute to improving government performance in at least
three ways. Each stakeholder group may choose to work alone, with each group
focusing on the agencies and agency sub-units that serve or protect the group's
members. Groups may form coalitions, either with other groups that have
similar interests or with groups across several disciplines. For example, civil
rights groups could band together only with each other or they could work with
environmental and worker rights groups. Finally, groups across ideologies and
interests could form a clearinghouse organization that lobbies on government
performance issues and provides information, data, and analysis to all of its
members without regard to ideology, as well as the public.
Either the coalition approach or the clearinghouse approach seems
most likely to succeed. Oversight of the federal government's performance and
performance management and measurement, as well as the data analysis
required to understand and influence government performance, require
advanced skills and knowledge. Just as Congress needs help from the GAO and
the inspectors general, stakeholder groups need help from their own experts
154
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with experience, deep knowledge, and sophisticated skills. Too many
stakeholders cannot afford this level of investment. Banding together is the best
method to achieve economies of scale, reduce each stakeholder group's costs,
and increase the likelihood that stakeholders will play a meaningful role in
improving government performance.
V.

CONCLUSION

The fundamental premise of this Article is that government matters to
the lives of the American people. Government can help to make Americans'
lives better, facilitate greater and fairer opportunities, protect from the
depredations of markets as well as natural and human-made disasters, provide
for the common welfare, and make us safe from enemies foreign and domestic.
For most Americans who seek progressive social change, government is one
mechanism through which this change will be accomplished. While legislative
and regulatory improvements to our laws and new laws can be important
channels for accomplishing progressive outcomes, in a harshly polarized
political environment like that found in Washington for much of the last quarter
century, progressive law reform through Congress may not be possible. Even in
the best political environment, law reform can be rendered meaningless or
made fully effective depending upon the quality of government performance.
Social change can also be realized in either event through a tighter and more
aggressive focus on the day-to-day management of the government.
Progressives must not allow themselves to become knee-jerk defenders
of government. Government is a tool to achieve a result, not an end in itself.
Good intentions, flowery rhetoric, and even policies with which progressives
agree should not be sufficient. Those who are committed to social change
should demand evidence, in real time and readily understandable,
demonstrating that government is effecting that change. When government
fails, progressives should be the first to sound the alarm and demand better.
A second fundamental premise of this Article is that solutions to
government performance failures begin with more democracy, more
transparency, and more accountability for elected and appointed officials. The
biggest challenge is not overcoming wrongheaded priorities or bad judgment or
management, although there are some of each in the federal government.
Rather, the challenge is to ensure that government's goals and actions are
perennially grounded in the genuine needs and desires of the American people.
This is the very essence of democracy. Only extensive engagement between
government and governed, and open government information and data that
facilitates deeper understanding of government, can ensure government
agencies that function in this way.
This Article sought to critique the laws that purport to structure and
guide the federal government's performance planning and measurement while
telling the story of how one agency, the Labor Department, succeeded in
improving its performance, sometimes despite these laws. This Article also
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sought to offer a path forward to further improving federal government
performance both through congressional reforms and activist stakeholder
engagement. If government matters to progressive social change, and its
performance can be improved, then government performance must be at the
very center of any progressive agenda for the future.
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